A PLAN FOR SERVICE-WIDE EDUCATION OF NAVY PERSONNEL ON THE MISSION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Kenneth W. Moorhead

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

School of Public Relations and Communications

Thesis

A PLAN FOR SERVICE-WIDE EDUCATION OF NAVY PERSONNEL ON THE MISSION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

By

Kenneth W. Moorhead

Lieutenant, United States Navy

(B.S.C., Central Y.M.C.A. College, Chicago, 1943)

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

1957

35902

PREFACE

This thesis is an attempt to develop new ways of educating or indoctrinating naval personnel on the mission and capability of the Navy. In reaching this objective it was first necessary to review the Navy's mission as it relates to the national strategy of the United States and to summarize its present capability to wage war.

The second phase was then to determine the amount of understanding naval personnel have of these areas, and how it is distributed in the personnel structure. This form of analysis led to the utilization of a descriptive type survey of 166 naval personnel. The survey study is the backbone of the thesis and is believed to be a significant step in the Navy's utilization of this form of research. In this respect the survey may be considered in the nature of a pilot study which could form the basis of a more detailed and larger scale research project. The writer ascertained during interviews with researchers in the Personnel Measurement Research Branch of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C., that this study does not duplicate any that has been undertaken by that office.

A comprehensive statement of the Navy's mission and a discussion of its present capability are necessary elements in developing the survey and interpreting the results. This understanding of mission and capabilities serves as a foundation for the entire study.

While the fundamental mission—control of the seas—has not

This thesis is an effort to review the area of recruitment or industrial-labor relations research on the nature and capability of the Navy. In reviewing this objective it was first necessary to review the Navy's needs as it relates to the medical strategy of the United States and to develop the research capability to meet them.

The second issue was then to determine the sources of manpower-the naval personnel have to draw from, and how it is distributed in the personnel structure. This form of analysis led to the utilization of a descriptive type survey of 100 naval personnel. The survey study is the backbone of the thesis and is believed to be a big element step in the Navy's utilization of this form of research. In this respect the survey may be considered in the nature of a pilot study which could form the basis of a more detailed and larger scale research project. The author conducted deeply interviews with researchers in the Personnel Management Research Branch of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C., that this study does not duplicate any that has been undertaken by that office.

A comprehensive research of the Navy's mission and a discussion of its present capability are necessary elements in developing the survey and interpreting the results. This understanding of mission and capabilities serves as a foundation for the entire study.

While the fundamental random-sampling of the sea-duty not

changed, the means (capabilities) for accomplishing this mission have taken on a new look as a result of the tremendous scientific developments occurring since World War II. Such a changing picture then is the cause of the problem of education as seen by this writer.

Fundamental changes are taking place in three major physical characteristics of the Navy; it is going from oil to nuclear energy for power to propel its ships, from guns to guided missiles for its armament, and from gunpowder to atomic weapons and supersonic planes for its offensive power. Such a fluid situation calls for continual assessment of the effect such changes have on attitudes and abilities of personnel who must adjust to these changes. Do they understand the over-all affect of these changes on their jobs—their future—as part of the Navy team? Are they keeping up with the pace of these changes?

This study would have been impossible without the interest and active cooperation of the teaching staff of Boston University's School of Public Relations and Communications. Grateful acknowledgment is made to its members for their helpful guidance during the formulative and analytical stages of the study. Special acknowledgment is made to the staff of the Division of Research for its contribution to the solution of problems involved in the survey of naval personnel. Special recognition is acknowledged to Dr. Nathan Maccoby, Chairman of the Division of Research and Professor of Opinion Research; Malcolm Klein, Instructor in Communication Research, both for their many helpful criticisms of the research project and its refinement at the various stages of progress; and to Samuel G. Atkinson, Professor of Public

Relations and major thesis advisor, for his encouragement and guidance in planning and executing the over-all study.

Considerable assistance was provided by Commander Eric S. Purdon, USN, District Public Information Officer, First Naval District, his staff and Captain V. J. Meola, USN, Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Receiving Station, Boston, and personnel of his command.

The writer also acknowledges with thanks the contributions made by the several naval reservist graduate students at Boston University who contributed ideas for use in the questionnaire and aided in its preliminary check on validity.

Boston, Mass.
July, 1957

K. W. Moorhead

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Since World War II there have been a number of important changes in the fundamental concepts of sea power, strategy, tactics, and weapon systems. Two major factors have caused these changes—pressures of the cold war and a number of great scientific developments. Of major concern to the Department of the Navy is the effect of these rapid changes on the attitudes, understanding, and adjustments required of its personnel.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. The purpose of this study is to investigate, through scientific research techniques, how well naval personnel understand the Navy's mission and its capability to carry out that mission. Then, using the results of this investigation, to build a plan of education to supplement or improve present methods in accomplishing this objective.

Importance of the study. A basic consideration in this study was the realization that motivation, or interest-attitude levels of personnel, in these areas is of an extremely heterogeneous nature when considering the entire personnel structure of the Navy. Psychologically, however, knowledgeability in these areas contributes greatly to the total character development of the man in uniform. His adjustment to

[illegible]

[illegible] changes in the fundamental concepts of sea power, strategy, tactics, and weapon systems. Two major factors have caused these changes—[illegible] the cold war and a number of great scientific developments. Of major concern to the Department of the Navy is the effect of these rapid changes on the attitudes, understanding, and adjustments [illegible] its personnel.

I. [illegible]

Statement of the problem. The purpose of this study is to investigate, through scientific research techniques, how [illegible] naval personnel understand the Navy's mission and its capability to carry out that mission. Then, using the results of this investigation, to build a plan of orientation to supplement or improve present efforts in accomplishing this objective.

Importance of the study. Early consideration in this study was the contention that motivation, or interest-attitude levels of personnel, in their areas is of an extremely heterogeneous nature [illegible] considering the entire personnel structure of the Navy. Organizationally, however, amalgamating these areas contributes greatly to the total effectiveness [illegible] in action. Its adjustment to

the Service, by a better understanding of his role in it, will permit him to function more effectively in future military assignments in which he shares the responsibilities of the global commitments of the Navy.

Public relations significance. Various studies on retention of personnel in the military services have pointed out that a great number did not feel "a part of" the service.[1] On the contrary, a great number felt that they were simply small "cogs" in a "big machine."

These people could not relate their daily tasks to the larger purpose or objective of their command unit, or in turn, to the over-all mission of their branch of service. The public relations problem then is to help naval personnel understand the nature of their tasks and to give them recognition as human beings.

When this is accomplished, the Navyman's attitude to his work and shipmates should improve; he will become more of a group member reflecting a higher degree of esprit de corps. His personal and family relationships should also improve because he knows better why he is in uniform, in which direction he is heading, and how to get there. Because he has more confidence in himself, understanding his own goals better, he is better able to carry out the Navy's mission. This well-adjusted individual then becomes a more effective "salesman" or

---

[1] Conclusions from a study of 211 officers leaving the Navy in September, 1956, showed that greater leadership emphasis was needed to give junior officers "a sense of belonging" and to furnish them "information on the Navy's role, missions, and future." The survey was conducted by the Personnel Analysis Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and reported in the Officer Fact Book, NAVPERS 15898, (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956), p. 2-8.

"spokesman" for the Navy. Instead of a negative attitude he will begin to think constructively in terms of career planning.

The Navy will benefit tremendously by improving these attitudinal traits of character, confidence, and well-being since they manifest themselves so predominately in interpersonal relations—a fundamental consideration in communicating with people in more meaningful ways.

II. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is an attempt to measure knowledge levels, attitudes and opinions of a sample representing as closely as possible the entire personnel structure of the Navy. Social science research techniques have been used but due to geographical considerations the survey was conducted in the area of Boston (for enlisted men), and by mail (for officers) within the First Naval District (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island) including ships operating in the area.

II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Mission. The fundamental wartime mission of the Navy is to control the seas and deny their use to the enemy. While this basic assignment has not changed, the nature and scope of the various roles involved have changed considerably since World War II. These will be discussed in detail in Chapter II.

Roles. For this paper "roles" are considered to be specific aspects, or tasks, that in the aggregate compose the Navy's mission. In this sense they are the lesser divisions or sub-missions of the over-all mission.

Functions. This term is synonymous with "responsibilities," "missions," and "tasks" as defined in the directive issued by the Secretary of Defense in 1953 to clarify the functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[2]

Capabilities. This is a generic term applied to all offensive and defensive warfare actions in support of the Navy's mission. The term may be broken down to apply to a very specific, narrow task but implies amount or volume of delivery to accomplish and sustain the purpose or objective. Thus, a statement that the Navy has a capability of airborne early warning (in a specific overseas area, for example) implies that enough planes and radar equipment are available to give the minimum protection or coverage to that area.

IV. AREA TO BE STUDIED

Sources of data. This study has been developed from four major sources of information: (1) a descriptive survey of officers and men on active duty in the Navy, (2) official Navy training publications, (3) report on enlisted career symposia, and (4) interviews with educators and others.

Method of procedure. Data and information from these sources was analyzed in respect to developing the major objective of the thesis—a plan of education.

Treatment of findings. Analysis of data from the above sources

---

[2] "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, October, 1953, Section VII, appearing in The Department of the Navy and Its Secretary (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956), p. 11-35. See Appendix A for additional terms and definitions.

was utilized in developing the final recommendations in the plan of education. In this process the analysis of survey findings was related to specific recommendations in the conclusions discussed in Chapter VI. Other sources are related to the plan wherever practicable.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

One is inclined to think that the Navy's mission is simply to "control the seas" and let it go at that. Such a convenient psychological device for understanding complex phenomena is a gross oversimplification of the many factors involved in formulating the Navy's mission.

I. THE NAVY'S MISSION

In order to gain a greater understanding of this mission it is necessary to discuss the concepts on which it is founded. These are the concept of national strategy and the concept of sea power.

Concept of National Strategy. The very existence of the U. S. Navy is related directly to the national strategy of the United States; its aims and objectives, its natural resources, national income, and foreign commitments. These are some of the determinants of national strategy.

Since World War II the United States has assumed the leadership role of the free world, a role reflecting the desires and capabilities, need and courage, threats and resistance, appetites and weaknesses of some 70-odd nations. Admiral Carney, former Chief of Naval Operations said:

> With the signing of NATO and SEATO, plus all the bilateral and multilateral agreements throughout the world, sea control

[illegible]

[illegible] "natural law" [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible]. Such a conventional psychological [illegible] [illegible] quality [illegible] in a [illegible] simplification of the many factors involved in formulating the [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

In order to gain a greater understanding of this question it is necessary to discuss the [illegible] which it is formed. These are the [illegible] of [illegible] and the [illegible] of [illegible].

[illegible] or [illegible]. In very [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] influenced directly in the [illegible] strategy of the United States; its aims are [illegible], its [illegible] resources, [illegible] [illegible], and foreign [illegible]. There are [illegible] of the determinants of national strategy.

Since World War II the United States has assumed the [illegible] role of the free world, a role including the desires and capabilities, [illegible] and [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible], as allies and [illegible] of some [illegible] nations. Material [illegible], former [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] and [illegible], plus all the [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the world, are [illegible]

> must be given collective consideration, with each nation contributing those strengths best suited to its technological, economic, political, military, and geographic circumstances. One country may have non-military maintenance strength, another may be rich in mineral deposits, still another may have specialized in building and operating combatant tonnage.[1]

Concept of sea power. One measurement of the status and strength of a country is in terms of its capacity or capability to maintain control of the sea. The nation with control of the sea is in a position to motivate the populations and assemble the material resources of the entire free world.

The United States, according to former Secretary of the Navy Thomas:

> is more dependent than ever on overseas sources of raw materials. Of the 77 strategic and critical materials needed for our defense production, civilian industries, support of our economy, and maintenance of our standard of living, 66 of them must be imported in whole or in part from across the oceans. In only 11 are we self-sufficient. Without access to our transoceanic sources of raw materials, we could not build modern airplanes, nuclear-powered ships, missiles, electronic equipment, and the modern machinery of all kinds that go into our armed services.[2]

Sea power, measured in ships, planes, weapons, and men, then must keep open the vital lines of communication and supply; project fighting power from the sea onto enemy soil; support our world-wide base system; fulfill international agreements; control enemy submarines, and many others.

---

[1] Robert B. Carney, Admiral, USN. "Principles of Sea Power," Naval Institute Proceedings, September, 1955, p. 971.

[2] Charles S. Thomas, former Secretary of the Navy, in a speech before the Symington Subcommittee, United States Senate, June 27, 1956, Navy Public Statements (Washington: Department of the Navy, August, 1956), p. 2.

II. VARIOUS ROLES

The most comprehensive statement of the various roles, functions, and responsibilities of the Navy was found in a special publication used by the Secretary of the Navy as a current reference source and for briefing new secretaries as they are appointed.[3]

> The United States Navy exists for two fundamental purposes. First, the Navy's task is to support the foreign policy of the United States in widely separated areas of the world. Naval forces deployed for this purpose are also ready for war—limited war, as well as all-out nuclear war. Second, the Navy's role in war is to control and use the seas for our own purposes and to deny their use to the enemy. Of major importance is the task of controlling the vital sea approaches to the United States and the Western Hemisphere, in order to deny their use to enemy forces—air-surface, and sub-surface. The Navy must also supply and support the overseas operations of ground and air forces; it must maintain communications with friendly and allied nations around the globe; and it must maintain communication with United States overseas sources of raw materials.
>
> A modern, well-equipped Navy has the unique characteristic of enabling the United States to project its national power, including ground and air elements into any strategically important area of the globe. Naval power represents an economy of investment in national security which cannot be matched by any other form of military power. Units of the fleet are part of the sovereign territory of the United States, regardless of where they may be operating. No international agreements or commitments need precede our use of naval forces which operate in international waters of the high seas. Naval forces are practically self-sustaining and normally replenish themselves at sea.
>
> In addition to the above offensive mission, the Navy has the responsibility of protecting the continental United States from attack by way of the sea. Advent of the submarine capability of launching guided missiles with nuclear warheads greatly increases the antisubmarine warfare task of the Navy. Intensive research

---

[3] The Department of the Navy and Its Secretary, a report on basic facts pertaining to the Navy, how it operates, and its place in the organization for national security. Prepared by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956), pp. I-1 to I-6.

and development are needed to meet it.

Mobile naval forces represent an investment which always remains the property of, and under the control of, the citizens of the United States. The economy of naval power explains in large measure why nations in history which have had the wisdom to turn to the sea for security have invariably been able to prevail over their land-power rivals.

The role of the United States Navy is increasingly important. The size of the Navy's task and the tools with which it will work will vary with the changing world situation, as well as with technological developments. The size of the task and the nature of the tools during any given period will depend upon many factors, among which are:

1. The will of the people of the United States to retain their position as a world power.
2. United States reliance upon overseas sources of raw materials.
3. The nature and number of United States overseas political and military commitments.
4. The nature and extent of a prevailing threat to the security of the United States.
5. The influence of new developments in weapons on tactics of naval power.

To attain a clearer understanding of the effect which the foregoing factors will have upon the future role of the Navy, each will be considered separately.

World power. Today, the United States has assumed the responsibility of free world leadership, a responsibility which we did not seek but which is bestowed upon us as the greatest power of the free world emerging from World War II. To understand the meaning of this power and its influence upon other nations, it is first necessary to consider our geographical position. A study of the globe reveals that about 70 percent is water... . Much of the land area consists of deserts, mountain areas, and wastelands, which are not suited to support large populations. The most populous areas of the earth are, first Europe and Western Asia; second, Eastern Asia; third, India; fourth, the United States; and fifth, Japan. Since international relations are relations between groups of people, most of our major problems in this field arise in our dealings with these heavily populated areas, all of which are readily accessible to the United States by way of the sea.

The common bond of the seas connecting the United States with her many friends and allies around the world is a powerful

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] will work with the changing world economics, as well as with technological developments. The size of the navy and the nature of the world during our future critical will become more and more [illegible] among which are:

1. The will of the people of the United States to remain their position as a world power.
2. United States failures upon overseas sources of raw materials.
3. The nature and number of hired overseas military and military commitments.
4. The nature and extent of a presidential threat to the security of the United States.
5. The influence of the ideology that is opposed to maintaining naval power.

To create a clearer understanding of the effect which the foregoing factors will have upon the future role of the navy, each will be considered separately.

World power. Today, the United States has assumed the responsibility of free world leadership, a responsibility which we did not seek but which is bestowed upon us as the greatest power of the free world emerging from World War II. To maintain and the security of world power and the influence upon other nations, it is first necessary to continue our governmental position. Many of the [illegible] that among [illegible] in order... [illegible] work of the Joint Area Committee of Congress, [illegible] Congress, and researches, which are now united to account large commitments. The most populous areas of the earth are, first, Europe and Russia along second, Eastern Asia along third, India fourth, the Indian Ocean and Africa, [illegible]. Since international relations are [illegible] power of [illegible], most of our major problems in this [illegible] in our relations with these newly populated areas, all of which are readily accessible to the United States by air as by sea.

The common land of the seas connecting the [illegible] which are easy transport or military [illegible] the world is [illegible]

force which has been a source of understanding among the maritime nations of the world for many centuries. With very few exceptions today, wherever the land touches the sea, the United States has friends and allies. It is evident that every important international decision we have made since the end of World War II is based on the assumption that we can and will maintain control of the seas. In other words, though not specifically stated as such, the United States in her actions is pursuing a national policy based on maintaining control of the seas. The majority of the maritime nations have signed mutual defense pacts with the United States. Even though many of these nations are situated in positions exposed to Soviet attack, all signed the pacts with the feeling that they were bound to us, rather than separated from us, by the seas. And in so signing, each nation staked its future on the ability and intention of the United States to maintain its position as a leading world power. This position of world power cannot be maintained unless we continue to maintain the ability to dominate worldwide sea communications... .

Reliance upon raw materials. While World War II left the United States in the position of a great world power, the same war was also a substantial drain on our own natural resources. Great scientific and technological advances which are being made in all areas of research are placing new demands on raw materials which either do not exist in this country or are becoming in short supply. For these reasons the United States, relatively self-sufficient in agricultural produce is rapidly becoming a "have not" nation. We are forced to import from all parts of the world from 25 to 100 percent of each of over 50 essential raw materials ranging from asbestos to zinc. It is the Navy's responsibility to provide for the security of our worldwide overseas trade, and so maintain our essential war industries as well as the war efforts of our allies. With our worldwide sea communications secured, the world stands with us; without them, we stand alone.

Overseas commitments. The Navy's future responsibilities will also be dependent upon the number and nature of United States overseas commitments. An estimate of our future obligations can be based on our present pledges. Today the United States is bound by mutual defense treaties to 42 nations, comprising 680 million people on six continents across the world's major oceans. Besides the mutual defense treaties, we are bound by no less stringent ties to an additional 20 nations with nearly half the total population and approximately half the total land area of the earth. All of these lie across the oceans from the United States. We have committed large portions of our military forces and resources to Western Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and the Western Pacific in order to assist free peoples of the world to defend themselves against possible Communist aggression. The United States, in addition, is providing economic aid and military missions to the four

corners of the free world. It will be necessary to continue our overseas commitments, tremendous as they are, in the foreseeable future.

The United States has made these political and military commitments as much in its own interest as in that of its allies. For it is our allies who will eventually restore the balance of power in Europe and Asia....

The Navy is responsible for sustaining and providing for the security of the many contingents of the Army (in 73 countries) and Air Force stationed overseas. Stationing of land forces overseas in peacetime presupposes that they can be sustained and supported by sea from the day a war begins--not a week or a month later. This is a D-day responsibility of the Navy! Unless logistic support can get through to them, and unless their positions can be secured, our forces must eventually withdraw from their overseas positions or face destruction. The same is true of any other commitment. If the Navy is unable to maintain control of the water leading to, or adjacent to, critical areas of the globe, any forces which we have in such areas will be in serious difficulty.

Responsibilities of the Navy toward any overseas commitments of the future may be illustrated by our current commitments in Western Europe alone. In order for the Army and Air Force to fulfill their missions in Western Europe, the Navy must be prepared to perform three broad tasks in the event of war. First, the Navy must continue to maintain sea communications to Western Europe. In order to accomplish this, enemy submarines, aircraft, surface craft, and other weapons which can be used against our convoys must be repelled or destroyed. Enemy bases from which these weapons can operate must be neutralized. Second, the Navy must provide combat support to U. S. and allied land forces. This combat support includes air, missile, and gunfire support. It includes landing of Army and Air Force where and when they are required. It includes the capability of bringing them off the beach when required--not as refugees, but as organized fighting units. Experience in Korea reemphasized the fact that, in order for any army to conduct successful combat operations overseas, adequate naval forces must be in a position to supply it, support it, and secure its flanks. Before we can do this, <u>we must have the seas under our control</u>. This will be as true in any future war as it has been in the past. Third, the Navy must deny to the enemy areas essential to his operations. If an enemy is permitted to use the Baltic and Norwegian Seas unmolested, our Western Europe position will be outflanked from the north, and England will become untenable. Therefore, in order to protect the Northern European flank, shipping, naval forces, and aircraft, which an enemy employs to exploit these seas, must be neutralized or destroyed. This will include neutralization of bases from which

enemy forces operate. Unless an enemy's ability to use the Aegean Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Adriatic Sea is denied, our European position will eventually be outflanked from the South.

For each overseas commitment made by the United States, the Navy has certain definite responsibilities. The Navy must supply and support it, and must protect it from overseas attack by an enemy. It is evident that current Navy overseas responsibilities are considerable and cannot be expected to decrease.

As our allies regain their strength and the balance of power is restored on the perimeters of Europe and Asia, it can be anticipated that our forces and base facilities on foreign soil will gradually be reduced. As this occurs, the influence exerted by our mobile naval forces stationed in international waters in strategically important areas of the globe will be vitally important to our continued security. Such forces, equipped with the latest weapons--including atomic weapons, new aircraft, and ballistic missiles--and maintained in the highest state of readiness, can be a stabilizing influence around the globe ... .

The threat to our security. In order to analyze the extent and nature of the military threat to the security of the United States, we must again consider our geographical position... . To the north lies a traditionally friendly nation and beyond that a vast Arctic wilderness. To the south are other friendly neighbors. It becomes evident that the security advantages afforded us by our fortunate geographic position can be matched by no other major nation or center of population. Those who would attack us must first cross the seas or the Arctic barrier. These great frontier areas have traditionally been formidable natural barriers to any enemy of the United States, but in this age of great technical progress they can lose their value rapidly unless we maintain the will and wisdom to control them by constant adaptation to scientific and technical advances... .

New developments. The decisive nature of naval power will increase with new developments in tactics and weapons. Nations have for many years struggled with the problem of gaining control of the sea for themselves, or of denying it to their enemies. Weapons and tactics have been many and ingenious. Some of these have posed capabilities which threatened to make the cost of controlling and using the sealanes prohibitively high. But more often than not, as new weapons have been developed, they have been adapted to shipboard use, facilitating control and use of the sea. The gun, mine, torpedo, and airplane have been used with great effectiveness to gain control of the sea after each, in its turn, as credited with capabilities to deny the seas to those who sought to control them. Today, the main threats to our control of the

seas appear to be the airplane, the submarine, and the mine; tomorrow, it may be something else. With atomic weapons and ballistic missiles, it requires little imagination to appreciate the tremendous possibilities of weapons such as these intelligently applied to the problem of controlling and using the seas... .

The Navy of the future will have at its disposal weapons and techniques which will make it an even greater dominating force than it has been in the past. New weapons, including atomic weapons and ballistic missiles, and new techniques will enable the Navy to conduct with increased effectiveness amphibious warfare, naval air warfare, submarine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and other types ... which seaborne forces are capable.

Research in hull propulsion design is also opening up new vistas which are yet to be fully explored. Limits on size and uses of ships are not yet in sight. Since the first atomic submarine, NAUTILUS, commenced operations in 1955, the Navy's revolution in ship design has taken on new impetus. This submarine has now become an active unit of the fleet, and the outstanding success of its revolutionary nuclear propulsion system is comparable to the change from sail to steam in the last century. As our experience in construction of nuclear-powered ships increases, the time required to build them, as well as their cost, will become progressively less. It is planned to incorporate nuclear propulsion systems in the major portion of new submarine construction and, in the next few years, to extend it to guided missile cruisers, frigates, and aircraft carriers. It is probable that most combatant ships will ultimately be atomic powered. With the addition of the "FORRESTAL" class attack carrier to the fleet and continuing improvement in present capability of carrier-based jet aircraft to deliver atomic weapons, the increase in striking power of the Navy is incalculable.

III. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND THE "FUNCTION" PAPERS

Essential references for defining the roles and missions of the Navy are incorporated in the following sources:

1. National Security Act of 1947, as amended to August 31, 1956.

2. "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," October 1, 1953, a directive of the Secretary of Defense.

3. "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," November 26, 1956, a

memoranda by the Secretary of Defense to the Armed Forces Policy Council.

These documents represent fundamental policy planning in the assignments of specific tasks to the various military services. Parts of these documents are quoted for a better understanding of the specific responsibilities assigned to the Navy.

National Security Act of 1947. The act defines the Department of the Navy as follows:

> SEC. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

Subparagraphs (b) and (c) were repealed and substituted by the following current provisions:[4]

> (10 USC) SEC. 5012. United States Navy; composition; functions
>
> (a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and is generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection to shipping.

---

[4] Ibid., p. II-13.

[5] Ibid., p. II-28 (Synopsis, Appendix III).

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(d) The Navy is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," October 1, 1953:

SECTION V—Functions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps

Within the Department of the Navy, assigned forces include the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. These forces are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, and for air and land operations incident thereto. Of the three major services, the Navy has primary interest in all operations at sea, except in those operations otherwise assigned herein.

A. Primary Functions

1. To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based naval air components. Specifically:

(a) To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce.

(b) To gain and maintain general sea supremacy.

(c) To control vital sea areas and to protect vital lines of communication.

[illegible]

[illegible] and air components involved [illegible] are [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible], together [illegible] necessary [illegible].

[illegible] naval aviation, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service forces. Members of joint commands as to those functions assigned or commanded between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(d) The ability to cooperative, in accordance with arrangements joint robust shown plans, for the expansion of the necessary components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

October 1, 1958:

Section V--Functions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps

Within the framework of the Navy, assigned forces include the active operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. These forces are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, and for air and land operations incident thereto. In the three major services, the Navy has primary interest in all operations at sea, except in those operations involving ground action.

A. Primary Functions

1. To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based naval air components. Specifically:

(a) To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce.

(b) To gain and maintain general sea superiority.

(c) To control vital sea areas and to protect vital lines of communication.

(d) To establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations.

(e) To seize and defend advanced naval bases and to conduct such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

2. To conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.

3. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other services, and to provide naval forces, including naval close air-support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces as assigned for joint amphibious operations in accordance with the policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. To develop, in coordination with the other services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations, and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.

5. To furnish adequate, timely and reliable intelligence for the Navy and Marine Corps.

6. To be responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, the protection of shipping, and for mine laying, including the air aspects thereof, and controlled mine field operations.

7. To provide air support essential for naval operations.

8. To provide sea-based air defense and the sea-based means for coordinating control for defense against air attack, coordinating with the other services in matters of joint concern.

9. To provide naval (including naval air) forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. To furnish aerial photography as necessary for naval and Marine Corps operations.

11. (Pertains solely to the Marine Corps.)

B. <u>Collateral Functions</u>

The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth above shall be employed to support and supplement

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

2. To conduct air operations as necessary in defense of naval [illegible].

3. To support and assist, in coordination with the other services, and to act as naval forces, including naval close air-support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all naval units, as well as joint amphibious operations in accordance with the policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. To service, in coordination with the other services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.

5. To furnish reasonably timely and reliable intelligence for the Navy and Marine Corps.

6. To be responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, the suppression of piracy, and for mine laying, including the air support thereof, and controlled mine field operations.

7. To provide the support essential for naval operations.

8. To develop sea-based air defense and the sea-based means for counteracting nuclear for defense against air attack, and to develop other services in matters of joint concern.

9. To provide naval (including naval air) forces as may be required for defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. To develop aerial photography as necessary for naval and Marine Corps operations.

11. [illegible] duty to the Marine Corps.)

[illegible] Functions

[illegible] Marine Corps are charged to perform the primary functions of the Marine Corps, which is employed to support and implement

the other services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the service having primary responsibility for a function shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final decision any disagreement within the field of his primary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another service. Certain specific collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are listed below:

1. To interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operation at sea.

2. To conduct close air support for land operations.

3. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.

4. To be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operations of the Department of Defense." This report to the members of the Armed Forces Policy Council clarified the following roles and missions:

1. Use of aircraft by the U. S. Army.

2. Adequacy of Airlift.

3. Air Defense.

4. Air Force tactical support of the Army.

5. Intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Sections in which the Navy is specifically mentioned are:

3. (c). The Navy, in close coordination with the Army and Air Force, is assigned responsibility for the development, procurement and employment of ship-based air defense weapon systems for

the accomplishment of its assigned functions.

(e). In overseas areas ... Navy forces should continue to be responsible for their own air defense at sea, employing organic means. As approved by the theater commander, the air component commander should establish such procedures for coordinating Army, Navy, and Air Force air defense forces as may be required to carry out his responsibilities, and, in addition, should establish such detailed procedures as are necessary for proper coordination with national air defense commanders of allied countries.

5. (b). Operational employment of the ship-based intermediate range ballistic missile system will be the sole responsibility of the U. S. Navy.

In summary, the Navy's mission, that of control of the seas, must be understood in terms of the national strategy of the United States and the collective desires of the American people. The Navy is responsible for executing their wishes, maintaining the degree or amount of sea power they decide upon as an expression of national strategy.

Congress has delegated specific tasks or functions to the Navy through the National Security Act of 1947 which were further clarified by the Secretary of Defense in 1953 and again in 1956.

This background material has been presented here as an aid to the reader in understanding the nature of problems and principles involved in the survey design, analysis, and conclusions discussed in the remaining chapters of this study.

[illegible]

[illegible] Navy [illegible] forces [illegible] to carry out a [illegible] ability [illegible] in peacetime, should conditions [illegible] necessary for proper coordination with [illegible] forces or [illegible] of allied countries.

[illegible] Navy.

In summary, [illegible] of control of the seas, and be successful [illegible] of overseas of the United States and the military [illegible] American people. The Navy is responsible for [illegible] the supply or amount of see power they devote upon an expansion of national strength.

Important and [illegible] tasks or [illegible] to the Navy through the [illegible] of [illegible] and again in 1936.

This [illegible] a [illegible] presented here as a [illegible] to see [illegible] in [illegible] the nature of problems and principles involved in the Navy [illegible], [illegible] discussed in the [illegible] chapters of this study.

CHAPTER III

SURVEY OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

I. SURVEY DESIGN

General. A descriptive survey was utilized in order to obtain empirical data on which to build the plan of education. The purpose or general objective of the survey was to determine, through scientific research techniques, how well the concept of "mission" and the term "capabilities" are understood by personnel in the Navy.

Specific objectives. A list of nine specific objectives was developed to serve as analytical aids in clarifying the general objective. They were:

1. To determine the degree of understanding of "mission" and "capabilities" on the part of officers and enlisted men.

2. To determine the level of factual knowledge in these areas from an awareness of current events pertaining to naval affairs.

3. To assemble data on opinions of naval personnel in regard to public recognition of the Navy's importance.

4. To assemble data on opinions of naval personnel as to the most effective weapons.

5. To examine interest-attitudes of naval personnel in these areas in order to arrive at an indication of motivation to learn.

6. To assemble data on sources of information utilized by naval personnel.

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] was [illegible] in order to obtain [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. The purpose or general objective of the survey was [illegible], through scientific research [illegible] [illegible] the concepts of "leadership" and the basic "capabilities" are [illegible] [illegible] in the navy.

Specific objectives. Each of the specific objectives was developed to serve as a [illegible] in clarifying the general objective. They were:

1. To determine [illegible] understanding of "leadership" and "capabilities" on the part of officers and enlisted men.

2. To determine the [illegible] of formal curriculum in these areas from the standpoint of [illegible] relevant to naval affairs.

3. To ascertain the [illegible] of naval personnel in regard to their recognition of the [illegible] importance.

4. [illegible] the [illegible] of naval personnel as to the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible].

5. [illegible] [illegible] of naval personnel in these areas [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] to [illegible].

6. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] offered by naval [illegible].

7. To gather data on reading habits of personnel in these areas.

8. To assemble data on opinions of the adequacy of information in these areas.

9. To assemble ideas and preferences for training methods to be utilized in expanding present educational practices.

Methodology. A number of questions relating to the scope and methodology had to be decided upon before proceeding with the survey. These were discussed in detail with various members of the teaching staff at Boston University whose concurrence was received. The more important of these were:

1. Size of sample. The sample size of 200 was arbitrarily selected by the writer to represent the approximately 670,000 officers and men on active duty in the Navy. The officer portion was arbitrarily set at 50 to represent the 70,000 officers while the number of enlisted was set at 150 to represent the 600,000 enlisted men. Within these size limits the designed distribution of each group (by rank and pay grade structure) was arrived at by percentage distribution in accordance with official personnel strength figures as of February 28, 1957.

2. Exclusions from the sample. In order to reduce somewhat the number of subgroups it was decided that no Marines, WAVES, nurses, or students under instruction would be included in the officer group. Exclusions in the enlisted group were: WAVES, men being processed for separation from the Navy, and men in a disciplinary status.

3. Method of data collection. The method of data collection was studied to determine whether depth interviews or questionnaires would

be the most appropriate means of gathering data. The questionnaire appeared to be the most feasible for this study due to the savings in time and expense with the additional advantage of allowing accumulation of a greater quantity of data in the time allotted for the study. Data collected and reported herein includes more than 12,400 items of information.

II. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION

After the specific objectives were drawn up and decided upon a large number of questions were constructed to obtain data relevant to each objective. The questionnaire was submitted to three professors, five naval reservist officers, and other graduate students for face validity checks and comments. Many suggestions for additional questions as well as deletions of some were received and incorporated into the instrument. This development and refining process took several months of research and coordination.

The same questionnaire was used for both officers and enlisted men which necessitated a certain amount of compromise in style and complexity of wording in order to reach the lowest and highest denominator of education level. Various cross-checks on truthfulness (validity checks) in answering questions were built into the instrument.

III. PRE-TEST OF QUESTIONNAIRE

The pretest was conducted with nine enlisted men randomly selected from transient personnel in the same place and in the same manner that

the final sample would be selected. The writer supervised the completion of the pretest questionnaires and interviewed the respondents after they had turned in the completed forms. In this manner the individual questions were further refined and some unnecessary questions deleted.

IV. DATA COLLECTION

A number of problems in regard to detail were encountered in selecting the sample and administering the questionnaires. General considerations included such problems as keeping a balance in distribution factors, such as: ship personnel vs. shore-based personnel; foreign service vs. no-foreign service; new recruits vs. old-timers; and specialists vs. general duty personnel. Selection of these factors were further complicated by the ratios of each rank and rate (pay grade) level.

Officer portion. This part of the sample was randomly selected from name rosters of approximately 110 naval activities and commands within the First Naval District.[1] Percentage distribution by rank categories was computed from official Navy personnel figures, for the entire Navy, as of February 28, 1957.[2] These percentages were then applied in computing the sample categories.

Questionnaires were mailed out to officers 100 per cent in excess

---

[1] See Appendix B for a complete list of naval commands represented in the officer sample.

[2] Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics, NAVPERS 15658, February 28, 1957. (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1957) various pages.

of designed quota in order to allow for the usual high percentage of no-returns. Legal officers at the First Naval District saw no objection to using official franked mail for outgoing and return of questionnaires. All mail questionnaires were turned over immediately to the writer upon receipt at the District Public Information Office.

Enlisted portion. This group was randomly selected from transient personnel reporting for further assignment to the U. S. Naval Receiving Station, Boston. Distribution by pay grades of the Navy's total personnel structure was computed in a manner similar to the officer group and applied to the selection of the enlisted portion. Special categories were eliminated from the sample based upon conference discussions and interest-attitude levels demonstrated in the pretest. These were:

1. Men in a disciplinary status of prisoners waiting legal action.
2. Men waiting to be separated from the Navy.
3. Men rehabilitated recently in retraining commands as a result of serious offenses.

The enlisted portion was scheduled for completing the questionnaires as part of their in-transit processing at the receiving station. No time limit was specified.

CHAPTER IV

SURVEY ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

I. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

The analysis of data obtained in this survey was organized in a manner to obtain as much useful information from the study as possible, all of it in relation to the general and specific objectives listed in Chapter III. Coding procedure and tabulating of responses are included in Part I of this chapter as the first steps in the analysis. The discussion of results in Part II of this chapter follow the general format of the questionnaire: face sheet data, questions on mission, questions on capabilities, and questions on sources of information.

Coding. Building of the code was started after the first group of completed questionnaires was received. About 30 questionnaires were analyzed to determine the pattern of responses and form of word-phrase groups appearing most frequently in responses to open-end questions. Each possible question response was given a separate column including those for "don't know," "undecided," and "no answer."

Tabulating data. After the code was constructed it was transferred to column headings on accounting work paper (14 x 34 inches) containing 30 major columns each of which contained seven smaller columns. More than 12,400 items of information were tabulated in this manner from the 63 questions asked of each respondent. After all questionnaires were coded and tabulated, the columns were added up and percentages

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Reliability of the items was checked after the first group of questionnaires was received. Item 4 [illegible] were designed to determine the extent of responses and type of novel-phrase answer spontaneously in response to open-end questions. Each question [illegible] response was given a separate column including those for "don't know," "nonexistent," and "no answer."

Multiple items. Four [illegible] was constructed to [illegible] to column location [illegible] Item 1 [illegible] combining [illegible] major columns [illegible] combinations [illegible] major columns. More than 10% [illegible] of [illegible] were [illegible] in this manner from the 50 questionnaires [illegible] of each respondent. After all [illegible] were coded, no [illegible], the [illegible] were [illegible] in the [illegible]

computed for use later in the analysis.

II. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

Findings of the survey will be presented here in six parts:

1. Re-evaluation of specific objectives.
2. Characteristics of the sample.
3. Discussion of responses to questions on "mission."
4. Discussion of responses to questions on "capabilities."
5. Sources of information reported by the sample.

Re-evaluation of original specific objectives. The analysis was developed in relationship to the specific objectives outlined in Chapter III. Modifications of preliminary objectives were required during the course of the study due to the doubtful value of subgroup analysis within the officer and enlisted personnel structures. It was apparent, after a study of present training programs, that any attempt to determine specific ranks and rate levels for more training in these areas was a theoretical matter and would not justify the cost and additional time required to break down each response into the twelve pay-grade subgroups. Efforts were made originally to study such related variables as: experience in the Navy, education, and major field of study for their effect on information attitude levels. Such an analysis was, however, determined to be of an analytical nature beyond the scope of the immediate study. Some of the reasons for this decision were: the small sample on which to base specific findings, difficulty in establishing criteria for these levels, and the time and expense limitation

[illegible] were [illegible] and form in six [illegible]

1. [illegible] of a [illegible] objective.
2. [illegible] of [illegible].
3. [illegible] of [illegible] to [illegible] on "[illegible]."
4. [illegible] of [illegible] on "[illegible]."
5. [illegible] of [illegible] by the [illegible].

Survey Location of Original Specific Objectives. The analysis was developed in a [illegible] to the specific objective outlined in Chapter III. Modifications of preliminary objectives were required during the course of the study due to the doubtful value of subject analysis within the offices and [illegible] structural structure. It was apparent, after a study of present training programs, that any attempt to determine specific [illegible] and rule levels for each training in these areas was a [illegible] and would not justify the cost and additional time required to break down each [illegible] into the twelve day-[illegible] [illegible]. Efforts were made originally to study such related variables as [illegible] experience in the army, education, and major field of study for their effect on information retention levels. Such an analysis was, however, determined to be of an analytical nature beyond the scope of the immediate study. One of the reasons for this decision was the small [illegible] to have sufficient [illegible], difficulty in [illegible] information for [illegible] and do [illegible] and course [illegible]

which would not permit use of IBM punch cards for tabulating data. Instead, tabulating was limited to the two major personnel categories, officers and enlisted men, in such a manner that each was a complete study or "profile" in itself. Then, the two were added together to arrive at a composite picture of what naval personnel know (facts) and what they think (opinions) they know about the Navy's mission and capabilities. The bulk of the analysis is presented in comparative table form with responses converted into percentage figures for ease in studying relationships.

Characteristics of the sample. The final sample included 49 officers and 117 enlisted men as compared to the 50 officers and 150 men originally planned. Reduction in the sample size was due to an unanticipated reduction in transient personnel being processed at the U. S. Naval Receiving Station, Boston, during the period June 10, through June 21, 1957. The time period available for conducting this study would not permit an extension of this portion of the survey. Nevertheless the sample is considered to be a fair representation of the cross-section of naval personnel as indicated in Table I.

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL APPEARING IN SAMPLE
BASED UPON ACTUAL PERSONNEL STRENGTH
FIGURES AT FEBRUARY 28, 1957*

Officers	Percentage strength in Navy	Designed number to be in sample	Actual sample No.	Actual sample %
Admirals	0.4	—	—	—
Captains	5.6	3	—	—
Commanders	11.8	6	5	10.2
Lieutenant Commanders	15.0	8	10	20.4
Lieutenants	21.3	10	13	26.6
Lieutenants (Junior Grade)	21.8	11	10	20.4
Ensigns	16.2	8	8	16.3
Warrant Officers	7.9	4	3	6.1
Total	100.0	50	49	100.0
Enlisted				
Chief Petty Officers	8.1	12	7	6.0
Petty Officers First Class	11.6	17	20	17.1
" " Second Class	10.3	15	10	8.5
" " Third Class	20.2	31	11	9.4
Seamen, Airmen, etc.	28.9	44	40	34.2
Apprentice Group	17.4	26	29	24.8
Seaman Recruit	3.5	5	—	—
Total	100.0	150	117**	100.0
Total Sample			166	

*Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics, NAVPERS 15658, February 28, 1957.

**Enlisted portion of the final sample was not as high as originally planned. This was due to a low level input into the U. S. Naval Receiving Station, Boston, during the two weeks available for gathering data. All enlisted rating groups were represented in the sample except: construction, dental, and steward groups.

[illegible]

[illegible] 26, 1957*

Officers	Percentage currently in Navy	Assigned number to sample	Percent female
	%	n	%
Admirals	—	—	—
Captains	[illegible]	3	—
Commanders	[illegible]	6	[illegible]
Lieutenant Commanders	[illegible]	8	[illegible]
Lieutenants	[illegible]	10	[illegible]
Lieutenants (Junior Grade)	[illegible]	11	[illegible]
Ensigns	[illegible]	6	[illegible]
Warrant Officers	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	50	[illegible]
Enlisted			
Chief Petty Officers	[illegible]	12	7
Petty Officers, 1st Class	[illegible]	17	[illegible]
" " Second Class	[illegible]	15	[illegible]
" " Third Class	[illegible]	11	[illegible]
Seaman, Fireman, etc.	[illegible]	44	[illegible]
Apprentice Seaman	[illegible]	26	[illegible]
Seaman Recruit	[illegible]	5	—
Total	[illegible]	130	[illegible]
Total Sample*		180	

*Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics, [illegible] 1958, January 31, 1957.

*Attached portion of the final sample was not as high as originally planned. This was due to a low level input into the U. S. Naval Recruiting Station, Boston, during the two weeks available for gathering data. All enlisted rating groups were represented in the sample except construction, dental, and steward groups.

The final officer portion of the sample represented 15 commands based ashore and five based afloat.[1] Of these 46.9 per cent were in the reserve forces while 51.1 per cent were in the regular Navy. This distribution compares favorably with the actual distribution in the Navy which is 44.2 per cent in the reserves and 55.8 per cent regulars. Other characteristics of the officer portion are shown in the following table:

TABLE II

DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICER SPECIALTIES WITHIN SAMPLE COMPARED TO THOSE IN ENTIRE NAVY

	Sample Number	%	Navy % Feb. 28, 1957
Line officers (including aviators)	28	57.2	67.6
Restricted Line Officers	4	8.1	4.9
Staff Corps Officers:			
Civil Engineer Corps	6	12.2	2.2
Supply Corps	3	6.1	7.1
Medical Corps	2	4.1	5.0
Chaplain Corps	2	4.1	1.2
Dental Corps	1	2.1	2.6
Medical Service Corps	—	—	1.5
Commissioned Warrant Officers	3	6.1	7.9
Total	49	100.0	100.0

Age distribution of officers was 20.4 per cent in each five year category from 20 to 34 years and 38.8 per cent over 35 years old. Of these respondents, 53.1 per cent indicated they were in the Navy on a career basis while 38.7 per cent indicated it was only a temporary line of work; 8.2 per cent were undecided whether they would make the

[1] See Appendix B for a list of naval commands represented in the sample.

Navy a career.

Service overseas since World War II was considered to be significant in a man's understanding of the Navy's mission. Results of a question on this item indicated that 75.5 per cent of officers and only 46.2 per cent of enlisted had performed duty overseas in the period mentioned.

Education distribution among officers questioned indicated that 46.9 per cent were college graduates and another 12.2 per cent had done postgraduate work. The study of courses in engineering was the most predominate (26.5%) major field of study. Arts (24.5%), sciences (18.4%), and business (12.2%) were the next most common study areas.

It was also found that 75.5 per cent of the officer group was married and 63.3 per cent had children. Most of the officers (71.4%) came from the east coast of the United States, and listed their fathers' occupations in the "skilled" category (28.6%). The next highest occupation of the father was in the professional category (22.5%) with the balance (48.9%) divided evenly between administrative-management, small business owner, white collar; and unskilled.

Future career time remaining for these officers showed that 26.5 per cent were expecting to be released from active duty within a year. The next largest group, 24.5 per cent, were those with 10 or more years remaining before retirement.

The enlisted men appearing in the sample varied from the officer group in a number of these characteristics. Generally, they were younger (49.7% were under 20 years of age compared to <u>no</u> officers

in that age group), had seen less active duty (26.5% had been on active duty less than a year), and fewer decided to make it a career (50.5% said "no" to career possibilities). It was noted that a significantly fewer number of enlisted had served overseas (46.2%) compared to the officer group (75.5%) and none had graduated from college. The number of married enlisted (34.2%) was less than half of the officers who were married. Socio-economic level of the enlisted group was indicated by the fact that 69.2 per cent listed their fathers' occupations in the "skilled," "semi-skilled," and "unskilled" categories. Those expecting to get out of the Navy within a year were about half the officer group although 47.0 per cent of the enlisted group expected to be out of the Navy within four years.

Responses to questions on mission. As stated earlier, the general objective of the survey was to attempt to measure how well the concept of mission is understood by people in the Navy. It must be realized that no exact measurement can be made of such a broad area of knowledge. The best that can be done is to infer the degree or amount of understanding a person has from the responses he gives to a series of fact and opinion questions related to the general topic. Such a procedure was followed in constructing questions to be submitted to respondents in this survey.

The questionnaire took several months to develop and a large volume of printed material was screened for ideas to be incorporated into the test instrument. Only those items were used, with one exception, that had appeared in commonly read sources of information readily

available to all persons in the Navy.

Related closely to knowledge level and of concern in this type of study is the interest-attitude a man has in learning about the broader aspects of his life in the Navy. Will he seek out information on the mission or must he be exposed to it entirely separate from his own initiative? How must he learn about these matters? More precisely, how much motivation does he exhibit toward this knowledge area?

The thirteen questions used to measure this area can be grouped roughly into fact, opinion, and interest-attitude categories.

The first fact question: "As far as you know, did the Navy take any action in the Israeli-Egyptian crisis?" was designed to measure knowledge level on current affairs involving the Navy. The fact that the Navy evacuated American citizens during the crisis period was widely publicized in civilian news media channels and especially in service newspapers and magazines. Other Navy action in that crisis period included placing ships in a higher state of readiness, addition of several fleet units, and concentration of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern area of the Mediterranean. The following table indicates survey responses to this question:

TABLE III

NAVY ACTION IN ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN CRISIS
RESPONSES GIVEN BY SAMPLE

Response	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Evacuated U. S. citizens	27.7	17.9	21.3
Stand-by (readiness)	32.3	10.6	18.1
Showed strength	26.2	9.7	15.4
Took no action	4.6	43.1	29.8
Strengthened fleet	4.6	--	1.6
Don't know	--	13.0	8.5
No answer	4.6	5.7	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Of significance is the high number of enlisted men (43.1%) who said the Navy did not take any action. The "don't know" enlisted group is also high in proportion to the officer group.

A second knowledge-level fact question was on the meaning of the abbreviations "NATO" and "SEATO," the two major military alliance pacts between the United States and other free nations. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is the Atlantic alliance, and SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) is the Pacific defense pact. Results of this question produced the following responses:

Response	Officers	Enlisted	Total sample
	%		%
Vacated in favor of citizens	27.7	37.9	31.3
Stand-by (reserve)	36.3	1.6	18.1
Shown strength	26.2	9.7	18.5
Took no action	2.6	41.1	20.8
Strongholded first	1.6	—	1.6
Don't know	—	11.0	5.5
No answer	5.6	3.7	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Of significance is the high number of soldiers who failed, while the mail the Army did not take any action. The "don't know" enlisted group is also high in proportion to the officer group.

A second cross-tabulated fact question was on the meaning of the above-mentioned "call" and "stand-by" the two major military alliance groups between the Allied Powers and other free nations, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is the Atlantic alliance, and SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) is the Pacific alliance. Results of this question produced the following responses:

TABLE IV

KNOWING OF THE NATO AND SEATO
RESPONSES GIVEN BY SAMPLE

Code category	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Know NATO	98.0	47.9	62.6
Know SEATO	83.6	19.7	38.6
Don't know NATO	—	35.9	25.3
Don't know SEATO	8.2	58.9	44.0
No answer NATO	2.0	16.2	12.0
No answer SEATO	8.2	21.4	17.5
Total	200.0*	200.0	200.0

*Note: Two questions were asked so data was compiled on the basis of 200%.

The table illustrates a very significant difference between groups on this question. The drop in knowledge percentage on NATO by enlisted men was slightly more than 50 per cent, and for SEATO there was a drop of almost 64 per cent. The "don't knows" and "no answers" were very high in the enlisted group also.

Four questions in the section on mission were designed to measure opinions. Two asked respondents what they thought were the reasons for keeping the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean[2] and the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa area. The third asked what they thought was the Navy's role in air defense of the United States, and the fourth was the most

[2] Arleigh A. Burke, Admiral, USN, said, in a discussion on the problem in the Mediterranean, "Our mission would be to protect U. S. lives and property first... What happens other than that is dependent upon what our own government decides we should do." "H-Bomb Cannot Wipe Out the U. S. Navy," U. S. News and World Report, May 4, 1956, p. 88.

crucial question—to state the Navy's mission. The first two of these questions will be grouped together in discussion and table even though the Sixth Fleet question was open-end and the Seventh Fleet question was closed-end. Table V shows the responses to these questions.

TABLE V

REASONS FOR MAINTAINING 6TH AND 7TH FLEETS IN RESPECTIVE OVERSEAS AREAS

Sixth Fleet	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Prevent aggression—stop spread of Communism	19.6	9.0	13.1
Show strength	15.2	12.3	13.4
Goodwill toward Allies	12.0	9.0	10.1
Proximity to area in case of trouble	10.7	6.5	8.1
Readiness if needed	10.7	14.9	13.4
Keep peace	8.7	11.6	10.5
Others*	21.9	14.2	16.8
Don't know	—	7.7	4.9
No answer	1.2	14.8	9.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seventh Fleet			
Slow spread of Communism in South East Asia	57.4	38.4	44.1
Halt Communist attack on Formosa	37.0	36.8	36.9
Prevent Nationalists from attacking the Mainland	3.7	18.4	14.0
Other	—	4.8	3.3
Don't know	—	—	—
No answer	1.9	1.6	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Includes a number of miscellaneous reasons none of which was considered to be significant.

The results shown above indicate more of a consistency between groups than was found in most of the other responses. This fact is interesting to note where the difference in overseas duty--first-hand experience with the Navy's mission--was so great. In the officer group 75.5 per cent had served overseas compared to the 46.2 per cent of enlisted men. The higher proportion of "don't knows" and "no answers" to the Sixth Fleet question was probably due to the open-end type of question.

The third question in the opinion area was: "What do you think the Navy's job is in the air defense of the United States?" Generally, the Navy's role in this area is in the seaward extensions of the radar warning network surrounding the United States. The Navy's task is to extend the DEW line (Distant Early Warning) and others by use of ocean station radar ships.[3] The Navy's area of interception of enemy planes is over the ocean expanses. Table VI shows responses made to this question.

---

[3] Ibid., p. 87.

TABLE VI

NAVY'S ROLE IN DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

Code category	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Radar warning	31.4	16.9	21.8
Interception of aircraft	31.4	17.6	22.3
Support Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD)	8.6	.7	3.4
Support Air Force	5.7	.7	2.4
Counter Attack	2.9	4.4	3.9
Off-shore patrol	1.4	8.8	6.3
Small importance	2.9	.7	1.5
Medium importance	1.4	--	.5
Great importance	1.4	6.6	4.9
Others	4.3	4.4	4.4
Don't know	1.4	19.2	13.1
No answer	7.2	20.0	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Of significance here is the 40 per cent (approximate) enlisted group in the "don't know" and "no answer" categories compared to the nine per cent of officers. Some confusion in question meaning may have occurred as evidenced by respondents' evaluation of job importance instead of stating what the role was in air defense.

The most crucial question in the opinion area was the one asking respondents to state the Navy's mission in their own words. Respondents gave a great variety of statements in their answers to this question. Twenty-six word-phrase categories were used to code these statements. Major categories in which each group gave answers are tabulated in the following table:

[illegible]

TABLE VII

MISSION OF NAVY FROM SURVEY RESPONSES

Code Category	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Control of the seas	8.8	4.1	6.3
Defend the United States	8.0	13.1	10.7
Aid Allies	6.3	8.2	7.3
Provide logistic support	5.9	4.5	5.2
Air attack from carriers	5.5	2.6	3.9
Take offensive action	5.5	3.4	4.4
Readiness to fight	5.1	5.2	5.2
Keep sea lanes open	4.6	3.4	4.0
Land U. S. forces	4.6	3.4	4.0
Deter aggression and keep peace	3.0	6.0	4.6
Maintain goodwill for United States	1.7	6.7	4.4
Other	38.9	27.4	32.6
Don't know	—	4.1	2.2
No answer	2.1	7.9	5.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: 44 officers, or 89.8%, gave answers in 2 or more categories.
62 enlisted, or 53.0%, " " " " " " "

Both groups were fairly consistent in their types of answers in the above table with relatively few in the "don't know" and "no answer" categories. Of significance is the lack of high percentages in any category. Highest categories were: for officers, "control of the seas" (8.8%) and for enlisted, "defend the U.S." (13.1%). Question wording, wherein the instruction was: "Discuss (mission) in detail as to roles, functions, responsibilities, jobs, etc. Please do not say just 'control of the seas'," probably accounted for the low numbers in this category. Also of significance is the low percentage (officers especially, 1.7%) who mentioned "maintain goodwill for the U.S."

Some reasons	Women	Men	Total
Amount of time or [illegible]	0.0	0.1	0.0
Other [illegible]	0.0	1.1	0.1
[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.3
Provide healthy [illegible]	0.0	0.[illegible]	0.0
Air [illegible] from [illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.0
Take [illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]
[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]
Keep [illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.0
[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]	0.[illegible]
[illegible]	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other reasons	1.7	0.7	0.1
Other	35.9	37.[illegible]	32.0
Don't know	—	0.1	0.0
No answer	0.1	0.3	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: In [illegible], 0.[illegible]% gave reasons in 2 or more categories.
62 [illegible], or 37.0%, " " " " " " "

Such groups were fairly consistent in their "pros" and cautions in the [illegible] with relatively few in the "don't know" and "no answer" categories. A significance is the lack of high percentages in any category. Fairness categories were: for efficiency, "control of the [illegible]" and for quality, "defend the [illegible]" (11.6%). Question [illegible], despite the [illegible] "[illegible] (11.6%) in overall [illegible], functions, responsibilities, jobs, etc. [illegible] "[illegible]" primarily responsible for the [illegible] in this order. Also of significance is the low percentage [illegible] (1.7%) who mentioned "[illegible] responsibility for the

Analysis of this question offers an opportunity for a number of statistical analyses and correlations on frequencies, relationships of variables of education, time in Navy, socioeconomic level, etc., all of which are beyond the immediate scope of this study.

In the interest-attitude or motivational area of learning more about the Navy's mission the following six questions were asked:

1. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the mission of the three military services?

2. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy's mission or not?

3. Would you like to know more about the Navy's mission or not?

4. Do you feel the Navy is telling you enough about its mission?

5. How do you think the part the Navy now plays compares with that of World War II?

6. What changes, if any, have the nation's leaders shown recently in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy in a future conflict?

7. Do you feel the Navy is receiving sufficient public recognition for the job it is doing in the Mediterranean?

Each of these questions was of the closed-end type. The first four will be discussed together because of the similarity of subject matter. Of prime importance in developing a study plan on the mission and capability of the Navy is to learn something about the level of motivation people have for learning subject matter in this field. The best way for determining this seemed to be to ask them. Heavy reliance, of course, must be made on honest answers, so in order to facilitate this, the questionnaires were kept anonymous. Table VIII presents

[illegible]

[illegible] the Navy's attitude. [illegible] six questions were asked:

1. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the mission of the three military service?

2. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy's mission or not?

3. Would you like to know more about the Navy's mission or not?

4. Do you feel the Navy is telling you enough about its mission?

5. How do you think you feel the Navy does compare with what it could do if?

6. Not answer, if any, have the respondents been recently in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy as a future possibility?

7. Do you feel the Navy is receiving sufficient public recognition for its job in doing in the Mediterranean?

Each of these questions was of the closed-end type. The first four will be directed toward the mission of the ministerial or assigned number. If other importance in constructing a study plan in the Italian sea area likely is the Navy is to learn something about the level of motivation [illegible] for Italian subject matter in this field. The last two questions were intended to be to ask them. Many [illegible] of [illegible] or [illegible] moment summary, so in order to facilitate [illegible] the [illegible] more [illegible] anonymous. Table [illegible] presents

respondents' answers to these four questions.

TABLE VIII

INTEREST-ATTITUDE QUESTION RESPONSES ON MISSION AN INDICATION OF MOTIVATION FOR LEARNING

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Understanding mission of three military services:			
Have little understanding	—	4.3	3.0
Have some understanding	46.9	62.4	57.8
Have very good understanding	51.1	32.5	38.0
No answer	2.0	.8	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Good understanding of Navy's mission or not:			
Yes	89.8	75.2	79.5
No	4.1	6.8	6.0
Undecided	4.1	17.1	13.3
No answer	2.0	.9	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
3. Would like to know more about the Navy's mission or not:			
Yes	73.5	76.1	75.3
No	18.3	16.2	16.9
No answer	4.1	.9	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
4. Opinion on whether Navy is telling its people enough about the mission:			
Yes	51.0	34.2	39.2
No	42.9	59.0	54.2
Don't know	—	3.4	2.4
No answer	6.1	3.4	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

The significance of data in this table is primarily in the high rate of officers who said they have a good understanding of the Navy's

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
4. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

mission (90%) with 74 per cent interested in learning still more about the mission. The enlisted group indicated less satisfaction with their knowledge of the mission (75%) but showed a three per cent higher interest level to learn.

Question No. 4 indicates that about half of the officers (51.0%) feel satisfied with the Navy's internal information program in regard to mission while enlisted men indicated they were not as pleased with the amount of information they receive. In other words, 65.8 per cent of enlisted would like more information on the Navy's mission.

Of interest in this table is to explore the reasons for the differences in understanding the mission of the three military services, the spread between the two groups in the "some understanding" category being 15.5 per cent. The questions here seem to be:

1. Do these figures represent respondents' true feelings or are they the type of answers "expected" of them? In other words, were respondents giving biased or true answers?

2. Of what effect is the respondent's frame of reference for basing his answer?

It is apparent that neither of these questions can be answered in this analysis but are mentioned here for the sake of recognizing the limitations and a terminal point for this analysis.

The second group of three questions in the interest-attitude area were designed to measure respondents' evaluation of the worth, or importance, of the Navy generally. From this sort of analysis it seems logical to infer, from reference group theory, the importance of "value"

the respondent places upon his own membership in the group. In this sense then a greater public recognition for the Navy means greater personal satisfaction for its members. The results of these three questions are included in Table IX.

TABLE IX

RESPONDENTS' EVALUATION OF NAVY'S MISSION, IMPORTANCE, AND RECOGNITION RECEIVED

Question and Code Category	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Importance of the Navy's role today compared with World War II:			
Greater now	55.1	65.0	62.1
About same	26.5	24.8	25.3
Less today	18.4	9.4	12.0
Don't know	—	—	—
No answer	—	.8	.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Attitude change of nation's leaders toward importance of the Navy:			
Decreased very much	—	1.7	1.2
Decreased some	10.2	19.6	16.9
No change	14.3	13.7	13.9
Increased some	55.1	34.2	40.4
Increased very much	16.3	26.5	23.5
Don't know	—	1.7	1.2
No answer	4.1	2.6	3.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
3. Sufficient recognition given to Navy for job in Mediterranean:			
Yes	59.2	33.3	41.0
No	26.5	37.6	34.4
Undecided	8.2	28.2	22.2
Don't know	—	—	—
No answer	6.1	.9	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Question and Answer	Officers	Enlisted	Total Sample
	%	%	%
1. Importance of the Negro's role under consideration when World War I ...			
Greater now	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
About same	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Less today	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Don't know	—	—	—
No answer	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2. Attitude change of Negroes's Increase toward Japanese since of the Army			
Has changed very much	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
Somewhat some	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Increased some	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Increased very much	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Don't know	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
No answer	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. Attitudes recognition given to Army for job in reintegration			
Less	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	—	—	—
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Results of question No. 1 in the table indicate that over half of both groups gave the Navy more importance today than in World War II. Enlisted men evaluated the Navy's importance to be greater, by 15 per cent, than did officers. Or conversely, twice as many officers as enlisted felt that the Navy was less important today. Roughly only one-fourth of both groups felt it had stayed at about the same level of importance.

Question No. 2 responses indicated that about 10 per cent more officers (total of two "increase" categories is 71.4%) felt that there had been increased recognition of the Navy's importance by the nation's leaders. It is significant to note that exactly the same percentage of officers (55.1%) felt that Navy's importance was "greater" in question No. 1 as said the nation's leaders showed "some increase" in the importance-of-the-Navy attitude in question No. 2. The enlisted group favored the highest category of increase by 10 per cent more than the officer group and at the same time marked more often in the "decreased some" category by 9.4 per cent. Higher markings in these categories reduced the "increased some" by 20.9 per cent below the officers. Evaluation of this question would indicate the officer group to be more conservative in evaluations at both extremes of the continuum.

Question No. 3 indicates that more officers (26%) than enlisted feel satisfied that the Navy is receiving sufficient recognition for the job it is doing in the Mediterranean. Additional significant information is indicated in the "undecided" and "no answer" categories. Twice as many enlisted respondents checked these two categories as officers.

[illegible]

[illegible] Navy's importance to the problem, it is not [illegible] conservatively, it is very [illegible] as [illegible] Navy has just [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] people [illegible] not appear as much the [illegible] of importance.

Question No. 5 requires multiples, but count to per cent more [illegible] of two "increased" categories in [illegible] [illegible] that there had been increased recognition of the Navy's importance by the nation's leaders. It is significant to note that exactly the same percentage of officers ([illegible] 50%) that Navy's importance was "greater" in question No. 1 as said the nation's leaders showed "more [illegible]" in the importance-[illegible] attitude in question No. 2. The multiple group ignored the highest category of increase by 10 per cent more than the officer group and at the same time [illegible] [illegible] "decreased some" certainly by [illegible] per cent. Higher multiples in these categories reduced the "increased some" by [illegible] per cent below the of 1a[illegible]. Validation of this question would indicate the officer group to be more conservative in evaluations at both extremes of the continuum.

Question No. 3 indicates that more officers (20%) than enlisted (5%) emphasized that the Navy is receiving sufficient recognition for the job it is doing in the antisubmarine. Additional significant information is indicated in the "undecided" and "no answer" cross-cross. Twice as many enlisted respondents checked these two categories as officers.

valuation of these three questions indicate that enlisted men are more optimistic about the future importance of the Navy but, at the same time, are doubtful of the public recognition it receives. Officers on the other hand are more pessimistic and conservative but believe that more recognition is given to the Navy in the areas tested.

Responses to questions on capabilities. Seventeen questions were designed to measure the second half of the general objective of the survey, the degree of understanding of the Navy's "capabilities." The questions have been divided into three categories, as in the "mission" section above, for discussion purposes. Groupings used were similar—fact, opinion, and interest-attitude categories.

The six fact questions designed to test knowledge levels in this area were:

1. Since World War II a number of scientific developments have increased the Navy's power to wage war. What are some of these?

2. Do you happen to know how many nuclear powered submarines the Navy has in service and under construction altogether? (Include those Congress has appropriated funds for.)

3. How many submarines do you think Russia has?

4. Does Russia have any nuclear powered submarines?

5. In what country were the last amphibious landings made by the Navy under actual combat conditions?

6. What is the total distance the Navy's newest carrier-based planes can fly? (Total of the mileage out and back.)

Responses to these questions are presented in Table X.

[illegible]

[illegible] Between [illegible] defined [illegible] the general [illegible] of the [illegible] "capabilities." The question have been raised [illegible] interpretation, as in the "statement" section above, for [illegible] view. Proponents used more [illegible] fact, opinion, and [illegible] categories.

The six [illegible] questions [illegible] to Navy analysts [illegible] in this area were:

1. [illegible] is the [illegible] of science-fiction developments have [illegible] the Navy's [illegible] in recent [illegible]? What are some of these?

2. [illegible] to [illegible] modern personnel [illegible] the Navy [illegible] in [illegible] contemporary [illegible]? (Include those [illegible] have [illegible] [illegible].)

3. [illegible] are [illegible] you think [illegible] have?

4. [illegible] any [illegible] personal [illegible]?

5. [illegible] Navy [illegible] have been [illegible] Banking made by the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

6. [illegible] [illegible] changes the Navy's [illegible] [illegible]-based [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].)

[illegible] are presented in Table 2.

TABLE A

RESPONSES TO ACTUALITIES IN NAVY'S CAPABILITIES
AS INDICATION OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE LEVEL

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Scientific developments since World War II:			
Nuclear propulsion	26.2	13.4	18.4
Guided missiles	23.8	25.5	24.8
Jet aircraft	12.8	12.7	12.7
Nuclear weapons	7.5	6.0	6.6
Improved guns and fire control systems, etc.	5.2	6.7	6.1
H-Bomb	4.7	2.6	3.4
Improved radar, sonar, etc.	4.1	6.3	5.5
Super carriers	3.5	11.9	8.6
Missile ships	3.5	2.2	2.7
Rockets	2.9	4.9	4.1
Other	5.8	1.1	3.0
Don't know	—	1.5	.9
No answer	—	5.2	3.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Nuclear submarines in service and under construction:			
3 submarines	14.3	28.2	24.1
6 submarines	36.7	17.1	22.9
9 "	20.4	18.8	19.4
12 "	8.2	4.3	5.4
15 "	8.2	4.3	5.4
18 "	—	.8	.6
21 "	—	5.1	3.6
24 "	—	1.7	1.2
Don't know	10.2	12.0	11.4
No answer	2.0	7.7	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Positions and [illegible]	[illegible] %	[illegible] %	Total sample %
1. Scientific [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	20.2	15.4	18.4
[illegible]	23.5	25.5	24.8
[illegible]	12.5	12.7	12.7
[illegible]	7.5	6.0	6.6
Improved [illegible]			
Control [illegible], etc.	5.2	5.7	6.1
[illegible]	[illegible]	2.6	3.4
Improved water, [illegible], etc.	4.1	6.3	5.5
[illegible]	5.5	11.9	[illegible]
[illegible]	3.4	2.2	2.7
[illegible]	4.3	4.9	4.1
Other	5.4	1.1	3.0
[illegible]	—	1.5	[illegible]
No answer	—	5.8	3.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Positions [illegible]	[illegible] %	[illegible] %	Total sample %
2. Positions [illegible]			
[illegible]			
3 [illegible]	4.3	20.2	14.1
6 [illegible]	30.7	17.1	22.9
" "	14.4	10.0	12.1
12 "	4.2	4.3	3.4
15 "	4.2	4.3	3.4
21 "	—	.5	.6
21 "	—	5.1	3.3
24 "	—	1.7	1.2
[illegible]	10.2	12.0	11.4
No answer	8.0	7.2	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE X (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
3. Estimate of number of Russian submarines:			
100 and under	2.0	3.4	3.0
200 submarines	12.3	5.1	7.2
300 "	10.2	4.3	6.0
350 "	6.1	—	1.8
400 "	26.6	6.8	12.7
450 "	14.3	3.4	6.6
500 "	8.2	6.0	6.6
600 "	2.0	.8	1.2
More than 600	2.0	7.7	6.1
More than the United States	2.0	5.1	4.2
Other	—	2.6	1.8
Don't know	12.3	42.8	33.8
No answer	2.0	12.0	9.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
4. Does Russia have any nuclear powered submarines?:			
Yes	8.2	38.5	29.5
No	77.5	35.9	48.2
Don't know	10.2	20.5	17.5
No answer	4.1	5.1	4.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
5. Country where Navy made last amphibious landings in combat:			
Korea	87.8	37.5	52.4
Okinawa	2.0	3.4	3.0
Iwo Jima	—	2.7	1.8
Other	2.0	9.4	7.2
Don't know	4.1	29.1	21.7
No answer	4.1	17.9	13.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE X (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
6. Longest range of carrier based planes:			
1,000 miles and under	8.2	6.8	7.2
1,000 to 1,500	8.2	7.7	7.8
1,500 to 2,000	12.3	5.1	7.2
2,000 to 3,000	30.6	6.8	13.9
3,000 to 4,000	6.1	3.4	4.2
4,000 to 5,000	6.1	3.4	4.2
Over 5,000	6.1	2.6	3.6
Don't know	16.3	47.9	38.6
No answer	6.1	16.3	13.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question No. 1 indicates the general level of awareness of major changes in ships, planes and armament which have taken place since the end of World War II. All officers in the sample gave answers in two or more categories. A similar check showed that 78.6 per cent of enlisted mentioned two or more scientific developments. Nuclear propulsion was mentioned most frequently by officers (26.2%) while guided missiles were mentioned most often (25.5%) by the enlisted group. Items mentioned in second place were just the inverse of these.

Question No. 2 was designed to test knowledge of current information on the Navy's atomic powered submarine capability, the fastest changing area of ship propulsion. The figures published for use by the 1957 Armed Forces Day spokesmen (May 18, 1957) listed the Nautilus and a "total of fourteen more nuclear powered submarines."

---

[4] Speakers' Guide for Service Spokesmen, Armed Forces Day, 1957, issue (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 10.

The third atomic propelled submarine, the Skate, was launched at Groton, Conn., on May 18, 1957, just three weeks before respondents were given questionnaires. This ceremony was widely publicized by military and civilian news media.[5] In view of these developments it was expected that most of the respondents would check in either the "3" or "15" category. Instead, most of the officers (36.7%) thought the Navy had six atomic submarines while the enlisted group (28.2%) indicated they thought there were only three. Of significance was the fact that neither group was close to the actual number of 15 submarines (only 8.2% of officers and 4.3% of enlisted selected this category). The "don't knows" and "no answers" were relatively high at 12.2 per cent for officers and 19.7 per cent for enlisted.

Question No. 3 is another question in the current affairs category of knowledge level measurement. Secretary of the Navy Thomas has frequently mentioned the figure 400 as the number of submarines Russia has. The press has reported this figure many times in the past year. Admiral Jerauld Wright, Commander in Chief Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, when discussing antisubmarine capabilities before the Overseas Press Club, said: "these (fleet) units are few... to account for the 400 Soviet submarines of today and their 85 per year increase."[6]

Of significance in these answers were the tremendously wide range

---

[5] Navy Times, April 20, 1957. Navy Times, the most widely read newspaper devoted to Navy news, carried a United Press story with dateline of January 18, 1957, on submarines in which it reported, "The Navy now has 15 atomic submarines either authorized, under construction, or completed." The same article indicated that four more are in budget requests for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1957.

[6] Jerauld Wright, Admiral, USN, "NATO Presentation Before the Overseas Press Club of America," March 28, 1956, Navy Public Statements (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956), p. 24.

of responses given by enlisted men. Answers varied from "6 or 7" to "4,000 to 5,000." The table clearly shows that none of the code groups named by enlisted respondents were near the 400 category. In fact, these respondents spread their answers fairly evenly in other categories with most of them (54.8%) in the "don't know" and "no answer" groups. The officers indicated a fair knowledge of this item but only 40.9 per cent clustered their answers into the 400 and 450 categories. The next highest officer groups were in the 200 and 300 range with 14.3 per cent in the "don't know" and "no answer" categories.

Question No. 4 produced interesting enlisted responses in view of the fact that no publicity one-way-or-the-other in regard to Russian atomic submarines has been reported in the press or made in speeches recently to the knowledge of this writer. The presumption then is that Russia does not have any atomic submarines. The significant fact here is that the largest category of the enlisted group (38.5%) believed that Russia does have nuclear powered submarines. The "don't knows" and "no answers" here, again, add up to more than one-fourth of the enlisted sample.

Question No. 5 was designed to test the sample in the current affairs area of amphibious warfare capability. The officer group indicated a high level awareness of this fact. The Navy's last amphibious landing under combat conditions was made in Korea. Of great significance is the large percentage of enlisted "don't knows" and "no answers."

Question No. 6 was included to see how Navymen were keeping up-to-date on the long-distance flying range (capability) of new planes operating from carriers. During World War II, the range of carrier planes was in the

area of 700 to 800 miles. Today's planes have an unrefueled range of 3,000 miles.[7] This question proved especially significant because just four days before the survey was placed in the field two Skywarrior, medium jet bombers, flew non-stop from the carrier Bon Homme Richard in the Pacific and landed on the USS Saratoga in the Atlantic. The press reported this event as "the first ocean-to-ocean carrier flight in history."[8] It was part of a demonstration of the Navy's capability in air striking power put on before President Eisenhower and members of his cabinet. These events may have helped the officer group to answer this question but, even so, the 30.6 per cent appears low for this group in light of the above circumstances. The enlisted group was extremely low percentage-wise with 6.8 per cent in the "2,000 to 3,000" mile category. Lack of awareness of the range of Navy planes after the ocean-to-ocean demonstration is considered to be one of the most significant findings in the survey. Mass media news of these events either did not reach these people, or they didn't associate the question with these events, or they were not interested enough to read about this kind of news. The high percentage of "don't knows" and "no answers" in both groups has considerable significance.

In the opinion area regarding capabilities six questions were used

---

[7] Charles S. Thomas, former Secretary of the Navy, in a speech before the Symington Subcommittee, United States Senate, June 26, 1956, Navy Public Statements, August, 1956 (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956), p. 7.

[8] By the Associated Press in the Boston Daily Globe, June 7, 1957, p. 1.

[illegible]

[illegible] Harold E. Stassen, Joint Secretary of the Navy, in a speech for the Symphony Subscriptions, United Station Canteen, June 24, 1950, Navy Public Relations Bulletin, June 1950 (Washington: Department of the Navy, [illegible]).

[illegible] Washington Daily News, June 7, [illegible].

as measuring tools.

1. Do you think the aircraft carrier is becoming more important in the event of a future war or less important?

2. Which weapon of <u>any</u> of the three military services do you think would be the <u>most</u> important single weapon in a future war?

3. List as many things you think the Navy could do to stop the enemy and bring victory. Include as many major warfare activities or jobs as possible.

4. Do you know what a hunter-killer group is?

5. What do you think is the primary job of a hunter-killer group?

6. The Navy's new atomic weapons have caused some change in its capabilities since World War II. How much change do you think has taken place?

Table XI contains the survey responses to these questions.

TABLE XI

OPINION RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON NAVY'S CAPABILITIES

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Importance of carriers in a future war:			
More important	81.6	87.2	85.6
Less important	4.1	5.1	4.8
Same	12.3	3.4	6.0
Don't know	2.0	2.6	2.4
No answer	--	1.7	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Most important single weapon of three military services:			
Missiles (ICBM--most mentioned)*	38.8	34.2	35.6
H-Bomb	16.3	9.4	11.5
Jet planes	--	6.8	4.8
Rifle (or foot soldier)	12.2	4.3	6.6
Missile submarine	8.3	3.4	4.8
Atomic weapons	6.1	11.1	9.7
Not one--all are important	6.1	1.7	3.0
Long range bombers of SAC**	4.1	6.0	5.4
Morale of men	2.0	--	.6
Carriers	--	.8	.6
Other	4.1	6.0	5.4
Don't know and undecided	--	6.0	4.2
No answer	2.0	10.3	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Intercontinental ballistic missile (U.S. Air Force)
**Strategic Air Command, U. S. Air Force

3. Things to do to stop the enemy and bring victory:			
Control the seas	12.4	1.8	7.0
Attack with carrier planes	11.9	9.0	10.4
Amphibious warfare	10.0	4.1	7.0
Missile warfare	8.6	8.1	8.3
Antisubmarine warfare	7.1	5.9	6.5
Destroy enemy shipping	4.8	4.1	4.4
Logistic support	4.7	2.7	3.7
Shore bombardment	4.3	4.1	4.2

Question and Some Answers	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Importance of carriers in future war:			
More important	72.6	87.2	85.6
Less important	4.1	5.1	4.8
Same	12.3	3.4	6.0
Don't know	2.0	2.6	2.4
No answer	—	1.7	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Most important single weapon of three military services:			
Missile (Polaris-Minuteman/*	28.8	34.2	32.6
H-bomb	16.3	9.4	11.5
Jet planes	—	6.8	4.8
Rifle (or foot soldier)	12.2	4.3	6.6
Missile submarine	8.2	3.4	4.8
Atomic weapons	6.1	11.1	9.7
Not one--all are important	6.1	1.7	3.0
Long range bombers of SAC**	4.1	6.0	5.4
Morale of men	2.0	—	.6
Carriers	—	.8	.6
Other	4.1	6.0	5.4
Don't know and undecided	—	6.4	4.2
No answer	2.0	10.3	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Intercontinental ballistic missile (U.S. Air Force)
**Strategic Air Command, U.S. Air Force

3. Things to do to stop the enemy and bring victory:			
Control the seas	12.4	1.8	7.0
Attack with carrier planes	11.4	9.0	10.4
Amphibious warfare	10.0	4.1	7.0
Missile warfare	8.6	8.1	8.3
Airtransporting warfare	7.1	5.9	6.5
Destroy enemy shipping	4.8	5.1	4.4
Logistic support	4.7	2.7	3.7
Show determination	4.3	4.1	4.2

TABLE XI (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Radar warning	4.3	2.7	3.5
Control submarines	3.8	2.3	3.0
Escort convoys	3.8	1.8	2.8
Offensive attack	3.3	7.2	5.3
Provide combat support	3.3	1.4	2.3
Defend the United States	3.3	1.8	2.6
Readiness for combat	2.9	3.6	3.4
Other	8.1	14.5	11.4
Don't know	.5	9.1	4.9
No answer	2.9	15.8	9.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: 87.8% of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories.
41.9% of enlisted " " " " " " "

4. Know what a hunter-killer group is:			
Yes	95.9	65.0	74.1
No	2.0	30.0	21.7
Don't know	2.1	2.5	2.4
No answer	--	2.5	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
5. Primary job of a hunter-killer group:			
Detect and destroy submarines	91.8	44.4	58.4
Seek out and destroy enemy	4.1	18.8	14.5
Don't know	2.0	24.8	18.7
No answer	2.1	12.0	8.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
6. Rating the degree of change in capabilities due to atomic weapons:			
Little change	2.0	0.8	1.2
Moderate change	8.2	15.2	13.3
Great change	55.1	52.1	53.0
Very great change	34.7	29.1	30.7
Don't know	--	.9	.6
No answer	--	1.7	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Results of question No. 1 support and affirm other statements made by Navy officials[9] that carriers are continuing to be of major importance in any possible future war. An announcement has been made that the first atomic powered carrier will be in operation by 1961.[10] Both groups are practically equal in their high rating of the aircraft carrier's importance. The enlisted men gave it a slightly higher mark (87.2%) as compared to the officers (81.6%). This was a closed-end question with four check-categories given.

Question No. 2 was designed to see whether Navymen would choose a weapon especially designed for naval warfare as the most important, or one from the other services. It was felt that a great deal could be learned about their general knowledge and thinking about military capabilities from responses made to this open-end question. Answering this question is admittedly difficult when there is such an array of destructive weapons now available to U.S. military forces. It is significant to note that both groups rated "missiles" more than twice as often as other weapons. In this category the intercontinental ballistic missile was mentioned specifically a number of times.[11]

---

[9] Arleigh A. Burke, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations in answer to an interview question about the change in attitude toward carriers in recent years said: "I think that people have started to recognize the importance of the carrier and what she can do as an important part of the total United States air power." "H-Bomb Cannot Wipe Out the U. S. Navy," U. S. News and World Report, May 4, 1956, p. 86.

[10] Army-Navy-Air Force Register, June 8, 1957 (p. 5), carried an article in which it said: "The Navy has requested funds for construction of an atomic powered carrier in the 1958 program and five more after that. Late in the 1961 calendar year, the Navy will have its first atomic-powered carrier in operation."

[11] The intercontinental ballistic missile (5,000-mile) is assigned to the Air Force. The longest range missile assigned to the Navy is a 1500-mile ballistic missile, "Decision on Missiles," Time Magazine, December 10, 1956, p. 25.

[illegible]

[illegible] carrier will [illegible] by 1961.[1]

[illegible] strategic importance. The United [illegible] gave it a military [illegible] (7.5%) as compared to [illegible] dollars (61.6%). This was a close-[illegible] with four [illegible] given.

Asking [illegible] was [illegible] to see which Russian [illegible] would choose a weapon essentially designed for naval warfare as the most important, or one from the other services. It was felt that a great deal could be learned about their general knowledge and thinking about military capabilities from responses made to this open-end question. Answering this question is [illegible] difficult from there is such an array of destructive weapons now available to [illegible] military forces. It is significant to note that [illegible] rated "missiles" more than twice as often as other weapons. In this category the intercontinental ballistic missile was mentioned specifically a number of times.[2]

---

[1] [illegible] Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations in answer to an interview question about the change in attitude toward carriers in recent years said: "I think the people have started to recognize the importance of the carrier and what she can do as an important part of the total united states air power." "Russia cannot ship out the U. S. Navy," U. S. News and World Report, May 4, 1959, p. 86.

[2] Air-Navy-Air Force Magazine, June 6, 1957 (p. 34), carried an article in which it said: "The Navy has requested funds for construction of an atomic powered carrier in the 1960 program and five more after that. Late in the 1961 calendar year, the Navy will have its first atomic-powered carrier in operation."

[illegible] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM-Atlas) is assigned to the Air Force. The longest range missile assigned to the Navy is a [illegible] missile. "Isolation on Missiles," Time Magazine, [illegible] 1959, p. 22.

Also of note was that officers ranked the rifle (or foot soldier) as the third most important weapon (after missiles and the H-bomb but before the missile submarine). Enlisted men ranked the rifle as fourth most important. The "don't knows" and "no answers" were relatively low percentagewise.

The third question in this series was designed as the most crucial measurement. It attempted to measure the understanding men had of the Navy's capabilities. As in the general question on "mission" it presented problems in coding due to the large number of categories. Here in the analysis stage it is difficult to assess the degree of understanding men have of this area. The question was deliberately reworded at the last minute before the pretest to eliminate the word "capabilities" which, in the opinion of several naval officers, was too abstract to be readily understood by the majority of respondents. The heavy overlap of five categories between this question and the one on "mission" (see Table VII) indicates respondents had either a hazy mental distinction between the two abstract terms or the question was poorly worded (low validity). Categories mentioned by respondents in both questions are in the percentages indicated in this tabulation:

	Capabilities		Mission	
Code items	Officers %	Enlisted %	Officers %	Enlisted %
Control of the seas	12.4	1.8	8.8	4.1
Attack with carrier planes	11.9	9.0	5.5	2.6
Logistic support	4.7	2.7	5.9	4.5
Defend the U. S.	3.3	1.8	8.0	13.1
Readiness for combat	2.9	3.6	5.1	5.2

[illegible] Under direction and the [illegible]-down but [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "[illegible] [illegible]" and "[illegible]" were relatively low [illegible].

The [illegible] [illegible] in this series was designed as the most crucial [illegible]. It attempts to measure the [illegible] [illegible] and of the [illegible] [illegible]. As in the general question on "[illegible]" it presented problems in coming one to the large number of categories. Here in the analysis there is difficult to assess the degree of [illegible] absorbing [illegible] [illegible] area. The question was deliberately [illegible] at the last [illegible] before the [illegible] to alienate the word "capabilities" which, in the opinion of several naval officers, was too abstract to be readily understood by the majority of respondents. The heavy overlap of five categories between this question and the one on "[illegible]" (see Table VII) indicates respondents use either a hazy mental distinction between the two abstract terms or the question was poorly worded (for validity). Categories mentioned by respondents in both questions are in the percentage indicated in this tabulation:

	Capabilities		Mission	
Data items	Officers %	Enlisted %	Officers %	Enlisted %
Control of the seas	15.4	1.8	8.8	4.1
Attack with carrier planes	1.9	9.0	5.5	2.6
Logistic support	4.7	2.7	5.7	4.5
Defend the [illegible]	[illegible]	1.8	8.0	13.1
Reasons for [illegible]	2.3	3.6	2.1	5.2

The first of these five items, control of the seas, of course is the primary over-all mission of the Navy. If respondents, in mentioning, control of the seas, under "things to do to stop the enemy" in the capabilities section were actually referring to the ability, or capability, then they would be displaying a high level understanding of the term "capabilities." This is not clear, however, from the responses given. "Capability" as mentioned in the earlier part of this study is taken to mean ability to take action in a specific area of warfare and usually for sustained periods of time. Respondents very seldom indicated this clearly in responses but merely mentioned weapons, planes, ships, etc., without saying what should be done with them, or where they should be used in warfare. The question: "List as many things you think the Navy could do to stop the enemy and bring victory. Include as many major warfare activities or jobs as possible," was considered sufficiently clear in this regard. The only conclusion, then, appears to be a lack of clear understanding between the two terms. Similar discussions could be advanced for the other four cross-mentioned categories.

In the interest-attitude, or motivational, area of learning about the Navy's capabilities, six questions were asked.

1. Each new weapon is designed to fit into the over-all capability of the Navy. Do you feel fairly certain that you know how each would be used in battle?

2. How well do you feel that you are kept informed about the capabilities of the Navy resulting from new weapons?

3. What percentage of the world's land would you guess can now be reached by carrier-based planes?

[illegible]

[illegible] ordered [illegible] capabilities [illegible] to the [illegible] ability, [illegible] term "capability." [illegible] given. "Capability" as [illegible] taken to mean ability [illegible] in a specific area of warfare and usually for [illegible] purposes of [illegible]. [illegible] noted this clearly in [illegible] bases, planes, ships, etc., [illegible] they should be used in warfare. The question "what [illegible] you think the Navy could do [illegible] the early and brief [illegible]. Include as many major warfare [illegible] or jobs as possible," was considered [illegible] clear in this [illegible]. The only conclusion, then, appears to be a lack of clear understanding between the two terms. Similar observations could be [illegible] for the other four cross-questions [illegible].

In the [illegible], or [illegible], area of learning about the Navy's capabilities, the questions were asked.

1. [illegible] question is designed to fit into the over-all capability of the Navy. Do you [illegible] fairly certain that you know how [illegible] would be [illegible].

2. [illegible] do you feel that you are kept informed about the capabilities of the Navy [illegible] from new weapons?

3. [illegible] the world's land world [illegible] can now be reached [illegible] land?

4. Do you happen to know whether or not the Navy can launch guided missiles from submarines?

5. Two of the Navy's experimental jet seaplanes crashed recently. Do you know if the Navy is continuing to develop this plane or not?

6. In your opinion, is the Navy giving its people enough training on the mission and capabilities?

Responses to these questions are presented in Table XII.

TABLE XII

INTEREST-ATTITUDE QUESTION RESPONSES TO CAPABILITIES AN INDICATION OF MOTIVATION FOR LEARNING

Questions and Code Categories	Officer %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Certainty of knowing how new weapons would be used in battle:			
Don't know	10.2	14.5	13.3
Not sure	34.7	43.6	40.9
Fairly sure	44.9	38.5	40.4
Very sure	8.2	.8	3.0
No answer	2.0	2.6	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. How well respondent feels he is kept informed about Navy capabilities:			
Little informed	24.5	41.0	36.1
Medium well informed	53.1	49.6	50.7
Well informed	20.4	6.8	10.8
Don't know	—	—	—
No answer	2.0	2.6	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
3. Percentage of world's land area that can be reached by carrier-based planes:			
Up to 25%	2.0	2.6	2.4
25 to 50%	8.2	11.1	10.2
50 to 75%	28.6	29.9	29.5
75 to 100%	57.1	47.0	50.1
Don't know	—	3.4	2.4
No answer	4.1	6.0	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
4. Navy submarine missile capability:			
Can be launched	89.8	81.2	83.7
Cannot be launched	—	1.7	1.2
Don't know	8.2	16.2	13.9
No answer	2.0	.9	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE XII (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
5. Seaplane development program (Seamaster):			
Continuing to develop	69.4	44.4	51.8
Decided to drop	--	2.7	1.8
Don't know	30.6	52.9	46.4
No answer	--	--	--
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
6. Navy giving its people enough training on the mission and capabilities?:			
Yes	28.6	23.1	24.7
No	53.1	35.0	40.3
Undecided	12.2	40.2	32.0
Don't know	--	--	--
No answer	6.1	1.7	3.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question No. 1 was provided with four alternative check-categories to make it easy for respondents to answer and to facilitate the later coding and tabulating process. By additional grouping now of the first two and last two, it is noted that 44.5 per cent of officers and 58.1 per cent of enlisted acknowledge that they did not have too good an understanding of the way the Navy would use its new weapons. These percentages are considered to be low in relation to the large percentage in each category that said they had a good understanding of the Navy's mission (89.8% of officers and 75.2% of enlisted). In the officer group 75.5 per cent had also served overseas since World War II.

Question No. 2, another closed-end question, was designed as a

cross-check on the reliability of responses given in question No. 1. The two questions were spaced five questions apart in the questionnaire. The second was a self-rating question on opinions regarding their own knowledge level of the Navy's capabilities. By comparing responses of these two questions, it is noted that only 24.5 per cent of officers said they were "little informed" compared to 44.5% of "don't knows" and "not sures" in No. 1. Forty-one per cent of the enlisted men said they were "little informed" as compared to 58.1 per cent in the uncertainty areas of weapon usage.

Question No. 3 provided another check on interest-attitudes by asking respondents to consider the world-wide operating, or mobility area, of the Navy in terms of the percentage of the land mass that could be reached by carrier aircraft. Higher percentages of responses were expected in the "75 to 100%" category than those received (57.1% for officers and 47.0% for enlisted). This was due to the fact that three-fourths of the world is water in which the Navy operates, plus the 3,000-mile range of carrier-based planes. A study of geographical land masses leaves only a relatively small area of Russia out of range of carrier-based planes.

Question No. 4 indicates that a higher percentage of both groups know this part of the Navy's capability in submarine warfare.[12]

Question No. 5 produced a high percentage of responses in the

---

[12] Some of this high percentage may have resulted from an article appearing in the Army-Navy-Air Force Register, June 8, 1957, in regard to the 2425-ton guided missile submarine USS Barbero joining the International Naval Review (June 12) in Hampton Roads, Va.

[illegible]

[illegible] "fixing [illegible] of "[illegible] areas" [illegible] 3.1 per cent of the pilots [illegible] "fixing [illegible] of [illegible] 3.1 per cent in the uncertainty area of [illegible].

[illegible] No. 3 [illegible] shows [illegible] by making responses [illegible] work-with operating, or [illegible] area, of the [illegible] of the percentage of the land area that could be [illegible] by [illegible]. Higher percentages of responses were [illegible] the "A" to [illegible] accuracy than those receiving [illegible] for officers [illegible]. This was due to the fact that three-quarters of the work is [illegible] the Navy operates, plus the [illegible]-mile [illegible] of [illegible]. A study of geographical land areas [illegible] a relatively small area of [illegible] out of range of [illegible].

[illegible] No. 3 [illegible] a higher percentage of both [illegible] [12] [illegible] accuracy and usability in [illegible] weather.

[illegible] No. 3 produced a high percentage of responses in [illegible]

---

[12] [illegible] of this high percentage may have resulted from an article appearing in the Navy-wide [illegible] magazine, June 4, 1951, in regard to the [illegible] joining the [illegible] in Washington [illegible], Va.

officer group who knew (69.4%) but less than half (44.4%) of enlisted knew the answer to this question. Press statements made by Navy officials shortly after the second jet seaplane crashed indicated that the Navy would continue to develop this plane. Numerous other articles have appeared in military newspapers regarding tests and development plans for this plane since that time. The large (52.9%) number of "don't knows" in the enlisted group may be due to the high percentage of this group (26.5%) who were in the "under-one-year" category of experience in the Navy.

Question No. 6 is significant in that it indicates that about three-fourths of both groups feel that the Navy is not giving its people enough training in the areas of mission and capabilities, or are neutral in the "undecided" category. Only one-fourth were positive enough to mark the "yes" category.

In summary, Table XII indicates that interests of both groups was the highest and most consistent in regard to the potential capabilities of the missile submarine and at the lowest knowledge level in use of new weapons. From comparison of question No. 6 in this table with No. 4 in Table VIII (opinion on whether Navy is telling people enough about the mission) an indication is noted that the enlisted group would like more information on both mission and capabilities. Officers are more interested in learning about capabilities as indicated by the significant change of 51.0 per cent "yes" on sufficiency of mission information to 28.6 per cent "yes" on training in capabilities.

Sources of information. Of major interest in analysis of knowledge, or information levels, for use in improving education is to investigate sources of the individual's information. Also of interest is to receive opinions and ideas from the group on what kind of information and how it feels that most training should be given in these areas. With these objectives in mind a number of questions were constructed in three broad areas: fact (sources of information), opinion (on effectiveness), and interest-attitude (suggestions for future training).

In the fact area three questions were constructed to find out where respondents got most of their information and to learn something of their reading habits.

1. Where do you get most of your information about the Navy?

2. Special lectures on the increasing importance of the Navy are being given at many commands. The lecture is illustrated with a series of color slides showing new developments and capabilities of the Navy. Have you seen this presentation?

3. How often do you read articles on the following topics:

Navy's role in peacetime?
Navy's role in wartime?
Sea power?
New weapons?
National strategy of the U.S.?
Articles on NATO, SEATO, and similar military pacts?

Responses received to these three questions are presented in Table XIII.

[illegible]

[illegible] objectives [illegible] number of questions were concentrated in three broad areas: [illegible] (awareness of "interaction"), opinion [illegible] effectiveness, and informal-entities (mainly [illegible] for future training).

In the test area there were four [illegible] concerned to find out where respondents [illegible] of their information and to learn something of their reading habits.

1. Where do you get most of your information about the Navy?

2. Special features on the increasing importance of the Navy are being given at many commands. The feature is illustrated with a series of color slides showing the developments and capabilities of the Navy. Have you seen this presentation?

3. How often do you read articles on the following topics:

Navy's role in peacetime	New weapons
Navy's role in wartime	Naval strategy of the [illegible]
Sea power	Articles on NATO, SEATO, and similar military pacts

Response received to these three questions are presented in Table [illegible].

TABLE XIII

RESPONDENTS' SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND READING HABITS

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Sources of most information about the Navy:			
Navy Times	16.2	17.3	16.9
Navy bureau publications	15.6	5.2	9.2
All Hands magazine	12.2	19.4	16.6
Time Magazine	10.8	3.0	6.1
People	4.7	6.5	5.8
Newsweek Magazine	4.1	1.7	2.6
TV-Radio	2.0	4.8	3.7
Naval Institute Proceedings (Mag.)	2.0	—	.8
Our Navy Magazine	.7	7.8	5.0
U. S. News and World Report	.7	.9	.8
Army-Navy Register	.7	—	.3
Other newspapers	12.8	16.5	15.0
Other magazines	12.8	10.0	10.6
Books (Bluejackets Manual, etc.)	—	.9	.5
No answer	4.7	6.9	6.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: 83.7% of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories.
61.5% of enlisted " " " " " " "

2. Have seen special sea power presentation:			
Yes	16.3	12.0	13.3
No	77.6	84.6	82.5
No answer	6.1	3.4	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
3. Frequency of reading articles on mission and capabilities:			
Navy's role in peacetime—			
Never	2.0	17.1	12.6
Sometimes	65.3	63.2	63.9
Often	26.5	12.0	16.3
No answer	6.2	7.7	7.2
Navy's role in wartime—			
Never	16.3	12.0	13.3
Sometimes	42.9	47.0	45.8
Often	34.7	30.7	31.9
No answer	6.1	10.3	9.0

TABLE XIII (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
Sea power—			
Never	6.1	12.0	10.2
Sometimes	55.1	45.3	48.3
Often	30.6	33.3	32.5
No answer	8.2	9.4	9.0
New weapons—			
Never	—	15.4	10.8
Sometimes	42.9	47.9	46.4
Often	51.0	28.2	34.9
No answer	6.1	8.5	7.9
National strategy of U.S.—			
Never	6.1	29.9	22.8
Sometimes	57.2	42.7	47.0
Often	30.6	12.0	17.5
No answer	6.1	15.4	12.7
NATO, SEATO, and similar pacts—			
Never	6.1	40.2	30.1
Sometimes	71.4	35.1	45.8
Often	14.3	6.8	9.0
No answer	8.2	17.9	15.1

The table shows that officers mentioned Navy Times, the civilian weekly newspaper, most often as one of their sources of information while enlisted mentioned the official Navy publication, All Hands magazine (a monthly published by the Bureau of Naval Personnel). Second and third in importance to officers were: official publications and All Hands. For enlisted the second and third places were: Navy Times and Our Navy magazine (civilian). Officers listed Time magazine as fourth while enlisted mentioned "people."

The second question is of value to see how far the special internal

information campaign on sea power has progressed since it was inaugurated more than a year ago. Teams of officers have been giving this illustrated presentation at a number of installations, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel has set it up in all schools under their control. If the percentage figures here apply to the entire Navy, more than 83,000 officers and men have seen this presentation to date. The sea power presentation is the major effort now underway to educate people on the mission and capabilities of the Navy.

Question No. 3 indicates reading habits in areas involving naval affairs. Most check-responses were in the "sometimes" read category. The officer group listed articles on NATO and SEATO most frequently while the enlisted group indicated "Navy's peacetime role" interested them the most. Second and third in each group were: for officers, the "Navy's peacetime role" and "national strategy;" and for enlisted men, "new weapons" and "Navy's wartime role."

In the area of opinion measurement on effectiveness of various educational methods and channels of information, a series of nine questions were constructed.

1. Do you think ship and station newspapers are effective or ineffective in keeping personnel informed about the Navy?

2. Do you send your ship's newspaper home to your family or friends?

3. Some service personnel feel that there is a great amount of information available from official Navy publications. Do you agree with this?

4. Are official Navy publications available to you when you want to read them?

[illegible] interested [illegible] of [illegible] understand [illegible] distribution, one [illegible] naval [illegible] national [illegible] control. If the peacetime [illegible] public [illegible] officers and [illegible] have been [illegible] to [illegible]. The sea power [illegible] is to [illegible] effort [illegible] economic [illegible] or the mission and capabilities of the navy.

Question 4b. I noticed [illegible] articles in [illegible] involving naval affairs. Most [illegible]-responses were in the "[illegible]" [illegible] category. The [illegible] group listed [illegible] and [illegible] frequently while the enlisted group indicated "navy's peacetime role" interested them the most. Second and third in each group were for officers, the "navy's wartime role" and "national strategy" and for enlisted men, "[illegible]" and "navy's wartime role."

In the area of opinion measurement on effectiveness of various [illegible] methods and channels of information, a series of nine questions were constructed.

1. Do you think sea, and shore [illegible] are effective or ineffective in keeping personnel informed about the Navy?

2. [illegible] you send your single newspaper home to your family or friends?

3. Some service personnel feel that there is a great amount of information available from official navy publications. Do you agree with this?

4. [illegible] official navy publications available to you when you want [illegible]?

5. In your opinion, how do you think wives of naval personnel feel about the amount of information they are getting about the Navy?

6. If married, do you think it would help you in your work if your wife knew more about the Navy?

7. The television programs called "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log" have been produced from Navy background material. Have you seen either of these programs?

8. How effective do you think these programs are in telling the public about the Navy?

9. How do you feel about the amount of information the Navy gives you about what's going on within the service?

Question responses for this series are presented in Table XIV.

TABLE XIV

OPINION RESPONSES ON EFFECTIVENESS OF INFORMATION MEDIA AND EDUCATION METHODS

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Effectiveness of ship and station newspapers:			
Effective	22.4	48.7	41.0
Ineffective	49.0	26.5	33.1
Undecided	24.5	21.4	22.3
No answer	4.1	3.4	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Send ship's newspaper home:			
Never	63.1	62.3	62.7
Sometimes	28.8	24.0	25.3
Often	2.0	6.0	4.8
No answer	6.1	7.7	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible] Navy?

[illegible] If [illegible] Navy, if [illegible] would tell you in your work if your wife knew [illegible] Navy?

4. The television programs called "Navy 26" and "Navy log" have been produced [illegible] commercial. Have you seen either of these programs?

5. How effective do you think these programs are in telling the public about the Navy?

6. How do you feel about the amount of information the Navy gives you about what's going on within the service?

Question responses for this series are presented in Table XIV.

TABLE XIV

OPINIONS [illegible] OF THE [illegible] WITH THE NAVY
FOR CONDITIONS NAMED

Questions and Some Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Effectiveness of adj. and [illegible] recruiters:			
Effective	22.4	48.7	41.0
Ineffective	42.0	26.5	33.1
Undecided	24.5	21.4	22.3
No answer	1.1	3.4	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Read adj.'s newspaper home:			
Never	63.1	62.3	62.7
Sometimes	28.8	24.0	25.3
Often	2.0	6.0	4.8
No answer	6.1	7.7	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE XIV (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
3. Agreement on statement about "great amount" of information being available in Navy publications:			
Yes	85.7	73.5	77.1
No	10.2	19.7	16.9
Don't know	—	.8	.6
No answer	4.1	6.0	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
4. Availability of Navy publications when men want to read them:			
Yes	81.7	48.7	58.5
No	10.2	40.1	31.3
Undecided	2.0	2.6	2.4
No answer	6.1	8.6	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
5. How wives feel about amount of information they are receiving about the Navy:			
Would like more	57.2	51.3	53.1
Have enough	30.6	20.5	23.5
Get too much now	2.0	14.5	10.8
Don't know	—	7.7	5.4
No answer	10.2	6.0	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
6. Would help husbands if wives knew more about the Navy:			
Yes	38.9	21.4	26.5
No	22.4	12.8	15.7
Some	10.2	7.7	8.4
Much	—	—	—
Don't know	2.0	4.3	3.6
Not married	20.4	45.3	38.0
No answer	6.1	8.5	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Total [illegible] %
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Yes	81.7	10.7	36.0
No	15.2	10.1	22.3
Undecided	2.0	2.6	2.4
No answer	1.1	8.6	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Yes	30.3	22.4	30.3
No	22.4	12.3	15.7
Some	10.3	7.7	8.4
Soon	—	—	—
Don't know	2.0	4.3	3.6
Not married	30.0	45.3	36.0
No answer	6.1	8.5	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE XIV (continued)

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
7. Knowledge of "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log" television programs:			
Have seen one	6.1	12.0	10.2
Have seen both	89.8	83.8	85.6
Have not seen either	—	4.3	3.0
No answer	4.1	—	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
8. Effectiveness of TV programs in telling public about Navy:			
Not effective	—	4.2	2.9
Fairly effective	57.8	47.5	50.6
Very effective	36.5	45.8	43.0
"Navy Log" not very effective	1.9	1.7	1.7
Don't know	—	.8	.6
No answer	3.8	—	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
9. Feeling about amount of information Navy gives personnel about what is going on:			
Receive too much	8.2	2.6	4.2
Not enough	38.8	61.5	54.9
Right amount	46.9	31.6	36.1
Don't know	—	.9	.6
No answer	6.1	3.4	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question No. 1 is an excellent illustration of differences in evaluating the importance of ship and station newspapers. Both groups were about equally divided, 50 per cent of each taking opposite views in their evaluations. Most officers rated these newspapers ineffective while the enlisted group showed more confidence in their effectiveness.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Total [illegible] %
7. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	—	[illegible]
[illegible]	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
8. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
9. [illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	—	—	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] Lack of [illegible] indicates lack of differences in [illegible] [illegible] on studied newspapers. Both groups are [illegible] quality criteria, [illegible] cent of each [illegible] opposite views in [illegible]. [illegible] criteria when those newspapers ineffective [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] confidence in their effectiveness.

It is significant that only 48.7 per cent of the enlisted group felt that these newspapers were effective.

Question No. 2 shows significant results due to slightly more (4.8%) officers who "sometimes" send their ship's newspaper home even though they were the most outspoken about the ineffectiveness of these papers.

Question No. 3 shows both groups agreed that a "great amount" of information is available from Navy official publications.

Question No. 4 indicates that enlisted men do not have as great an opportunity to see official publications as do officers. This lack of availability was mentioned in comments both groups made to the final question on suggestions for improvement in training methods.

About half of both groups in question No. 5 felt that their wives would like to receive more information about the Navy. Responses by officers to question No. 6 is significant in that almost 40 per cent said it would be helpful to them in their careers if their wives knew more about the Navy. This is over half of the 75.5 per cent married officers in the sample.

Questions No. 7 and 8 indicate that high percentages (in 80-90% bracket) of both groups had seen both "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log" television programs. But, in the second question, which was not worded well (because respondents had to give one answer for effectiveness of <u>both</u> programs), most officers rated these shows as only "fairly effective." Some respondents, however, wrote in another category for "Navy Log" and marked it "not effective" and gave"Victory at Sea" a "very effective" rating.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Question [illegible] a [illegible] present results [illegible] slightly more (4.3%) officers [illegible] "Overall [illegible]" need their own [illegible] report back even though they were the best originator about the effectiveness of their papers.

Question No. 3 shows both groups agree that a "great amount" of information is available from Navy official publications.

Question No. 4 indicates that enlisted men do not have as great an opportunity to see official publications as do officers. The lack of availability was mentioned in comments from groups more to the final question on suggestions for improvement in training methods.

About half of both groups in question No. 5 felt that their wives would like to receive more information about the Navy. Responses by officers to question No. 6 [illegible] slightly more than 60 percent said it would be helpful to them in their careers if their wives knew more about the Navy. This is over half of the U.S. per cent married officers in the sample.

Questions No. 7 and 8 indicate that men personnel (in both-)% brackets) of both groups had seen both "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Day" television programs. But, in the second question, which was not worded well (because respondents had to give one answer for effectiveness of both programs), most officers rated these shows as only "fairly effective." Some respondents, however, wrote in another category for "Navy Day" and marked it "not effective" and "Victory at Sea" [illegible] "very effective" [illegible].

In question No. 9 the highest percentage of officers (46.9%) felt that the Navy is telling them about the right amount of what is going on. This is not a high percentage in view of what it could be. The enlisted group gave almost twice as many "not enough" marks as the next highest category. This would tend to indicate they felt strongly about the lack of information.

In the interest-attitude area of the questionnaire two questions were used.

1. Where do you think that most of the instruction on the Navy's mission and capabilities should be given?

2. What are your suggestions on new ways of keeping personnel informed about the mission and capabilities of the Navy?

Table XV contains response results to these questions.

TABLE XV

INTEREST-ATTITUDE RESPONSES ON TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR NAVAL PERSONNEL

Questions and Code Categories	Officers %	Enlisted %	Total Sample %
1. Where to give most of the instruction on mission and capabilities:			
In schools	10.2	12.0	11.4
On-the-job	22.4	19.7	20.5
Both	55.2	63.2	60.9
Other	2.0	—	.6
Don't know	6.1	5.1	5.4
No answer	4.1	—	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Suggestions on new ways to keep personnel informed about the mission and capabilities:			
More lectures	17.9	17.6	17.7
Show more films	10.3	13.2	12.2
More instruction	7.7	2.5	4.2
Motivate people to learn	7.7	1.3	3.4
Films before theater movies	6.4	1.9	3.4
More training on job	3.8	2.5	3.0
Regular briefings for crew	2.6	3.1	3.0
Wider distribution of present material	2.6	9.4	7.2
Explain ship's movements to crew	2.6	.6	1.3
Use required training time	1.3	—	.4
Release more information	1.3	1.9	1.7
More demonstrations	1.3	—	.4
Indoctrinate wives	1.3	—	.4
Present methods O.K.	1.3	1.3	1.3
Other	19.1	12.6	14.7
Don't know and "none"	1.3	20.8	14.3
No answer	11.5	11.3	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: 40.8% of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories.
21.7% of enlisted " " " " " " "

Somewhat over half of each group indicated in question No. 1 that training in these areas should be conducted both in schools and on the job.

Motives and Gratifications	Officers	Enlisted	Total Sample
	%	%	%
1. Where do you get most of your information or training on your occupation?			
In school	32.2	4.0	12.4
In school	18.4	29.7	25.2
[illegible]	53.0	61.2	60.3
[illegible]	2.0	—	.6
Other	0.1	.1	.1
[illegible]	[illegible]	—	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

2. [illegible] motives or gratifications to [illegible] [illegible] the motives and gratifications			
[illegible]	17.4	17.6	17.7
[illegible]	4.3	1.2	12.2
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.2
[illegible]	7.7	1.2	3.4
[illegible]	6.[illegible]	1.2	3.4
[illegible]	2.[illegible]	3.3	3.0
[illegible]	2.6	3.1	3.0
[illegible]	2.0	.1	7.2
[illegible]	2.6	.6	1.3
[illegible]	1.3	—	.4
[illegible]	1.3	1.3	1.7
[illegible]	1.3	—	.4
[illegible]	1.3	—	.4
[illegible]	1.3	1.3	1.3
[illegible]	12.1	12.6	11.7
[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	1.3
[illegible]	11.3	11.3	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[illegible] of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories.
[illegible] of enlisted " " " " " "

[illegible] from Radio had to [illegible] No. 1 that

[illegible] combined both in schools are [illegible]

In suggestions made for new ways of training, both groups were in agreement on "more lectures" and "show more films." From there the two groups differed considerably. The officer group made more specific recommendations as to lectures, efforts to motivate people to learn, and suggested showing more Navy film documentaries before theater movies. The third highest percentage recommendation by the enlisted group was to make wider distribution of material presently being published by the Navy.

CHAPTER V

PRESENT TRAINING METHODS AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS

I. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT TRAINING PROGRAMS

Some form of education, or indoctrination, in the Navy's mission and capabilities is being taught to students in all Navy schools. The amount of time and method of presentation varies from school to school depending on the type of primary training being conducted. Recruits new to the Navy receive general orientation training on organization, functioning, special sea power presentation (mentioned earlier), and naval history. The highest level of study in these fields is reached in courses on strategy and tactics for senior officers at the Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

A summary of curricula offered in a few Navy training schools is presented in Table XVI.[1]

---

[1] Data assembled from Catalog of U. S. Naval Training Activities and Courses, NAVPERS 91769-B (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 2-77.

[illegible]

TABLE XVI

NAVY TRAINING COURSES RELATED TO MISSION AND CAPABILITIES

School	Students	Courses Offered
U. S. Naval War College Newport, R. I.	Admirals, generals, captains, and colonels	Advanced study in strategy, tactics, and sea power
Armed Forces Staff College Norfolk, Va.	Military officers with 10-15 years commissioned service	Orientation in joint military operations
Industrial College of the Armed Forces Washington, D. C.	Military officers with 15-24 years commissioned service	Orientation in world politics, economies, and power matters
National War College Washington, D. C.	Military officers with 15-24 years commissioned service	Study of factors in national power of U.S. and other nations
Naval Postgraduate School General Line School Monterey, Calif.	Regular Navy officers who were formerly reserve and temporary	Tactics and strategy
Naval Intelligence School Washington, D. C.	Officers selected for intelligence duty	Strategy
Naval School, Journalists Info. Officers Course Great Lakes, Ill.	LTJG through LCDR who show interest and ability in PR	Effect of sea power on history, current tasks, functions and organization of Navy
NROTC Courses at 52 colleges and universities in U.S.	College Students	Fundamental concepts of sea power, strategy, tactics and logistics
U. S. Naval Academy Annapolis, Md.	Midshipmen students	(Courses similar to NROTC above)
Recruit Training	Seaman, Airmen, Firemen	Indoctrination
Advanced enlisted schools	Selected students	Sea power presentation, lectures, films, etc.

[illegible]	Students	Courses Offered
[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible], [illegible], and colonels	Advanced study in strategy, tactics, and sea power
[illegible] College [illegible]	Military officers with 10-15 years commissioned service	Orientation in joint military operations
International [illegible] of [illegible]	Military officers with 15-20 years commissioned service	Orientation in world politics, economics, and power matters
National War College Washington, D. C.	Military officers with 15-20 years commissioned service	Study of factors in national power of U.S. and other nations
Naval War College School [illegible] Newport, R.I.	Regular Navy officers who were formerly reserve and temporary	Tactics and strategy
Naval Intelligence School [illegible]	Officers selected for intelligence duty	Strategy
Naval School, Communicate [illegible] Newport, R.I.	LTJG through LCDR who show interest and ability in [illegible]	Effect of sea power on history, current tasks, functions and organization of Navy
[illegible] at 12 colleges and universities in U.S.	College students	Fundamental concepts of sea power, strategy, tactics and logistics
U.S. Naval Academy Annapolis, Md.	Midshipmen students	(Courses similar to NWC above)
[illegible]	Green, Air Force, Marines	Indoctrination
[illegible]	Selected students	Sea power, presentation, lectures, [illegible], etc.

II. SPECIAL PROGRAMS

Sea power briefing program. A special sea power briefing presentation has been prepared (1956) for wide dissemination throughout the Navy. It is entitled "The Increasing Importance of the U. S. Navy" and outlines the tactics to be employed in utilization of the Navy's newest weapons in event of any future war. This presentation is an excellent method of bringing people up-to-date on the mission and capabilities of the Navy. It is now a "continuing part of the curricula of the Bureau of Naval Personnel schools."[2] The same material is being "incorporated into all Navy training publications and correspondence course programs,"[3] and into examination areas for advancement in rate of enlisted men.

Enlisted career symposia. The Navy is aware of the need of its enlisted personnel to be recognized as individuals to the extent that this is possible in a military organization. In 1956 it conducted meetings of its senior enlisted men at the training centers in Bainbridge, Md., and San Diego, Calif. Representatives were sent to these meetings from duty stations throughout the United States and overseas ships and stations.

A total of 197 recommendations were made to the Department of the

---

[2] Letter report by Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel (Education and Training) to the Chief of Naval Personnel, September 7, 1956, p. 1.

[3] Ibid., p. 2.

Navy in areas of special interest to enlisted career men. Those relevant to this study were:[4]

1. That emphasis on the Navy's role be continued directly to the individual.

2. That operating schedules of ships be established as far in advance as possible; promulgate the information, and insure that any changes made are done justifiably and not arbitrarily.

3. That ship deployment schedules be published far enough in advance for personal planning by men.

4. That weekly briefings be held for enlisted personnel with up-to-date information on current operations and deployment schedules.

5. That briefing sessions between commanding officers and chief petty officers take place at least once a week.

6. That more emphasis be placed on relationship of local mission to over-all role.

7. That Navy training films be directed toward a Navy audience, edited and kept up-to-date, showing latest developments of the Navy's role and mission.

---

[4] Ad Hoc Report on Enlisted Career Symposia Recommendations, a report prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 1040.1, February 12, 1957.

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] to work [illegible] to [illegible] work.

2. The operating activities of ships be specialized as far in a manner [illegible] the [illegible] information, and assure that any changes [illegible] are made promptly and not arbitrarily.

3. [illegible] complex [illegible] be [illegible] for [illegible] in [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible].

4. [illegible] briefings [illegible] for unlisted personnel with up-to-date information on current operations and deployment schedules.

5. [illegible] meeting sessions between commanding officers and chief petty officers [illegible] [illegible] once a week.

6. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on relationship of local mission to over-all role.

7. [illegible] [illegible] be directed toward a [illegible] audience, called and kept up-to-date, showing latest developments of the Navy's role and mission.

---

[1] See report on [illegible] Junior Officer Recommendations, a report prepared by the Flag [illegible] the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST [illegible], February 16, 1957.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. SUMMARY

This investigation has produced empirical data in the area of knowledge and understanding that personnel have of the Navy's mission and capabilities. Foundation for the study of this knowledge area was an analysis of current concepts of sea power and the national strategy of the United States. Out of this analysis was developed the concept of the Navy's mission, roles, and functions substantiated by documents setting forth fundamental policy directives.

Using this background material as a frame of reference for the study, a descriptive survey of naval personnel was conducted. Social science research techniques were employed to gain as high a degree of validity and reliability as possible in the study. The survey attempted to measure knowledge level and interest-attitudes of people now on active duty in the Navy. Many questions in the area of "mission" and "capabilities" were asked of respondents in a 166-man survey sample. Conclusions from the analysis of responses to these questions were discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

Present training methods and programs relating to this general area were outlined in Chapter V.

II. CONCLUSIONS

There seems to be a <u>very keen</u> awareness in the Navy of the problem

[illegible]

[illegible]

This investigation has focused conceptual data in the area of [illegible] and [illegible] concerned are of the army's mission and capabilities. Groundwork for the study of this knowledge area was an analysis of current concepts of war power and the national strategy of the United States. Out of this analysis was developed the concept of the Army's military role, the functions substantiated by doctrine relating total and social policy objectives.

With this foundation, criteria as a frame of reference for the study, a descriptive survey of social research was conducted. Social science research techniques were employed to gain as high a degree of validity and reliability as possible in the study. The survey attempted to measure attitudes, knowledge level and interest-attitudes of people now on active duty in the Army. Key questions in the area of "mission" and "capabilities" were asked of respondents in a 100-man survey sample. Conclusions from the analysis of responses to these questions were discussed in detail in Chapter [illegible].

Comment by [illegible] concerning relating to this general area were outlined in Chapter V.

[illegible]

[illegible] very few weaknesses in the Army of the problem

investigated in this study--that of training or indoctrinating people on the mission and capabilities of the Navy as an instrument of national defense. Great strides have been taken in the past year toward solving this problem. Many teams of lecturers have been conducting the special sea power briefings, other teams have been working on ways of improving the internal information program, commanding officers have been furnished a list of symposia recommendations made by senior petty officers with instructions to take action on a number at the command level. Wives of Navymen have been shown the special sea power presentation, taken on day cruises aboard ships and invited to visit shore commands where their husbands work.

Interviews conducted in Washington with training officials indicate that the academic approach to a study of subjects in these areas are as complete as possible. Curricula of schools have been recently reviewed and revised in this regard. In many schools where time does not permit a full scale course of instruction, individual instruction periods are used for lectures and film screenings whenever possible.

In view of the complete academic program now being followed in formal training schools, the recommendations in this paper will be in the nature of a very broad plan of education and internal information to reach deeper into the motivational and attitudinal areas of learning.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No. 1:

Discussion. Internal information of the kind that relates the main objective or function of the individual command to that of the over-all Navy seems to be the most important area for emphasis in a plan of education. A man's education at this level in the organization can be interpreted by him in more meaningful ways. In this manner a man can learn what the task of his unit is in the larger organization. When he relates his unit to a larger objective it will be easier for him to make the next downward adjustment to that on a personal level. He will be able to relate individual duties more readily to that of efficient functioning of the command. Briefings, lectures, indoctrination tours of the command, and demonstrations are a few techniques available to help orient individuals to their own command. Many of these devices were suggested in responses to survey questionnaires. Interest in the briefing procedure and need for more information were incorporated as recommendations by the enlisted career symposia.

Recommendation. That a system of command level briefings be established on a regular basis (weekly, monthly, or quarterly) with attendance required of all personnel as an information and education training program. This program should be developed in earnest fashion with sufficient high-level backing to the point where it becomes "built-in" to the Naval Establishment as a permanent responsibility of command. It should cover the relationship of the command and local mission to the over-all mission of the Navy. Responsibility in this area should be added to the check list of items to be reviewed at the annual Administrative Inspection of each command to insure compliance.

Recommendation No. 2:

Discussion. A comment frequently made by men aboard ships is the lack of information about operating schedules (survey responses pointed this out), where they are going on the next patrol or exercise and why. Personnel indicate that not enough is told them about the individual cruise schedule nor those planned for the future.

Recommendation. That a campaign be initiated to encourage commanding officers of ships to tell their personnel what the current unclassified operating schedules are for their vessels so that men may better plan their personal affairs and gain a sense of participation in executing operational or training exercises.

Recommendation No. 3:

Discussion. Internal information programs frequently suffer from lack of coordination and planning necessary to cause news or information material to flow from the many offices and control centers where it is generated. Not enough enlisted journalists are available to act as reporters covering such wide news beats within large commands. Some system of scheduling,or planning, is desirable that will cause information to be brought to the attention of those in immediate charge and released to media channels.

Recommendation. To investigate the feasibility of including a section in the public information annex to all operational plans called "informing personnel." This section to include date that information should be released to crew, a summary of how much detail should be released, and the name of the person responsible to see that it is executed on time.[1]

---

[1] See Appendix D for sample portion of public information annex in this regard.

Learning. [illegible] education [illegible] years from [illegible] the [illegible] loss of control over and [illegible] unnecessary to cause news or information-[illegible] to flow from the army offices and control centers where it is generated. But though unlicensed journalists are available to [illegible] as reporters covering [illegible] with news beats within large commands, some system of accreditation or clearing, is desirable that will cause information to be brought to the attention of those in necessitate charge and responsible to issue charges.

Accreditation. To investigate the feasibility of including a section in the public information annex to all operational plans called "Informing Personnel." This section to include data that information should be released to crew, a summary of how much detail should be released, and the name of the person responsible to see that it is executed on time.[1]

---

[1] See Appendix 3 for sample portion of public information annex in this [illegible].

Recommendation No. 4:

Discussion. A general comment voiced by many respondents in the survey was that not enough copies are available of All Hands magazine, Aviation News (both official Navy publications), and others. The enlisted group named All Hands most often as the source of most of their information about the Navy.

Recommendation. That wider distribution of All Hands magazine, Aviation News, and other similar official publications be investigated as a means of providing personnel with more educational material on the mission and capabilities of the Navy.

[illegible]

Recommendations. [illegible] be issued by Army headquarters to the survey and [illegible] to make the available of *All Hands magazine*, *Aviation News* (both official), *Shipmates*, and others. The published items [illegible] *All Hands* and others as the source of *Navy* of their information about the Navy.

Conclusions. The [illegible] distribution of *All Hands* or *Aviation News*, and other similar official publications be investigated as a means of providing personnel with more educational material on the mission and capabilities of the Navy.

Recommendation No. 5:

Discussion. The special sea power presentation has recently been revised. This presentation is a very comprehensive lecture, illustrated with color slides, on the Navy's mission and capabilities and discusses sea warfare tactics in the European area as well. The writer has seen the presentation twice and studied the printed material concerning it. Since it has been pretested on roughly 83,000 people as indicated in the survey, it would appear that it may be ready now for the next logical step in its development--that of a sound motion picture.

Recommendation. That an investigation be made into the feasibility of producing a sound motion picture on the sea power presentation called, "The Increasing Importance of the U. S. Navy," for theater screenings as a "short subject."

Recommendation No. 6:

Discussion. One recognized teaching technique, that of participation, could be effectively utilized to a higher degree in the teaching of mission and capabilities. By allowing a selected group of enlisted men to accompany ships on special exercises to foreign countries, and to observe fleet training exercises, atomic weapon tests, missile firing tests, etc., would appear to be an excellent teaching-by-doing device. Learning by participation and observation in this area is the most meaningful of all forms of education.

A competitive system for the most attractive cruise; such as, "honor cruises," would stimulate interest and lend itself to incentive programs designed to motivate personnel to learn more in this area. Those men who are in predominately shore-based billets would have more of an opportunity to see the operating forces thereby relating their individual duties to the larger objectives of the Navy.

Recommendation. That an investigation be made into the feasibility of establishing special quotas for enlisted participation in the more attractive overseas cruises; such as, the midshipman cruises to foreign countries, fleet training cruises; special weapons demonstrations; and on a lower level of participation, in the day cruises for dependents of naval personnel.

Recommendation No. 7:

Discussion. The need for improvement in dissemination of information internally was commented upon frequently in survey responses. The following recommendations are made based upon those findings:

Recommendation. That an investigation be made into the possible production of a series of Navy I.Q. test-yourself quizzes for use in various Navy newspapers and official publications. They may be similar to those appearing in Reader's Digest and other popular magazines but containing questions on mission, capabilities, etc.

Recommendation. That editors of Navy newspapers be encouraged to address a larger portion of their newspaper space and editorial content to wives of naval personnel. Stimulating interest of this group in Navy activities generally will serve as an effective tool to a better understanding of their husbands' duties and the objectives of the command.

Recommendation. That an investigation be made into the feasibility of establishing a Navy news bureau in Washington, D. C. for ship and station newspapers. Either a new section may be formed or the present functioning of the Armed Forces Press Service, as it pertains to Navy news, may be streamlined for more effective and faster news coverage of Navy events on a national scale.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PERIODICALS

Ad Hoc Report on Enlisted Career Symposia Recommendations. Washington: Department of the Navy, February, 1957.

Armed Forces Day, 1957. A report prepared by the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

Attack Aircraft Carrier--Mobile Striking Power. A report prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1957.

Carney, Robert B., Admiral, USN. "Principles of Sea Power," Naval Institute Proceedings, September, 1955.

Carriers Are Vital to the Atomic Navy. A report of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations prepared by the Bureau of Ships. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956.

Catalog of U. S. Naval Training Activities and Courses, Bureau of Naval Personnel. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

Clark, Champ; Cranston Jones, et al. "The Admiral and the Atom," Time, LXVII (May 21, 1956).

Cooke, R. J., Lieutenant Commander, USN. "The Navy's Role in the Atomic Age," Naval Training Bulletin, February, 1957.

Curriculum for Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (Line, Freshman Year). Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

"Decision on Missiles," Time, December, 1956.

Department of the Navy and Its Secretary. A basic fact book for the Secretary of the Navy prepared by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956.

"Flying Navy," a special issue of All Hands magazine. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, March, 1956.

"Guided Missile Navy," a special issue of All Hands magazine. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, March, 1957.

[illegible]

[illegible] Across Both Oceans. [illegible] by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Washington: Government Printing Office, [illegible].

Attack Squadron [illegible]. Washington: [illegible] by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1[illegible].

Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, [illegible]. Hitler vs. Roosevelt. The Undeclared Naval War. New York: Free Press, 1979.

Carriers are Killed by the Japanese Navy. A report of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to Secretary Knox during August of 1942. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942.

Cassidy, [illegible]. Naval Training Activities and Courses, Bureau of Naval Personnel. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

Clark, Joseph J., [illegible], et al. The Gilbert and Marshalls. Tokyo: [illegible], 1[illegible].

Cooke, [illegible]. Lieutenant Commander, USN. The Navy's Role in the Atomic Age. Naval Training Aids. Washington: [illegible], 1957.

Curriculum of Naval Officer Pilot Training Course (Line). Pensacola: [illegible] Headquarters of the Navy, May, 1936.

"Decision on Guadalcanal." Time, [illegible], 1[illegible].

Department of the Navy [illegible]. A basic fact book on the Department of the Navy prepared by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1[illegible].

"Dive Bomber." [illegible] Magazine. Washington: [illegible], 1956.

"Doctor [illegible]." [illegible] Naval Aviation. Pensacola: [illegible], 1957.

"H-Bomb Cannot Wipe Out U. S. Navy," interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. News and World Report, May 4, 1956.

"If Little Wars Come, U. S. Sixth Fleet--The Punch Behind the Doctrine," Newsweek, February, 1956.

Quotable Navy Quotes. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

Speakers' Guide for Service Spokesmen. The 1957 Armed Forces Day edition prepared by the Office of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

Speakers' Guide for Service Spokesmen. The 1956 Armed Forces Day edition prepared by the Office of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

Your Plans and the Armed Forces. Booklet prepared by the Defense Committee of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Washington: American Council on Education, 1955.

United States Navy. A booklet on the history, development, roles and missions of the Navy, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1957.

SPEECHES

Burke, Arleigh A., Admiral, USN. "Address Before Editors, Publishers, and Printers of the Mid-West," October, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "Remarks Before the Naval Industrial Symposium," New Orleans, November, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "The Importance of the Navy Is Increasing," message to the Fleet, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

_____. "The significance of the United States Control of the Seas," address at The Citadel, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

[illegible]

[illegible] "[illegible] the [illegible]," [illegible]

[illegible] Department of the Navy, May, 1950.

[illegible] for [illegible]. The 1957 [illegible] by [illegible] of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of [illegible]. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

[illegible] for [illegible]. The 1956 [illegible] by the Office of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of [illegible]. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

[illegible] and the [illegible]. Booklet prepared by the [illegible] committee of the North [illegible] Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Washington: American Council on Education, 1955.

United States Navy. A booklet on the history, development, roles and missions of the Navy, Office of Naval Foreign Intelligence and Research, Department of Defense. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1957.

Bibliography

[illegible], Admiral, USN. "Address before Editors, Publishers, and Writers of the [illegible]," October, 1956. Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "Remarks before the Naval Industrial Symposium," New Orleans, 1956. Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "The importance of the Navy is increasing," message to the Fleet, May, 1956. Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, U.S., 1956.

_____. "The significance of the United States Control of the Seas," address at the Citadel. Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

Combs, Thomas S., Vice Admiral, USN. "Before the Symington Subcommittee, United States Senate," May, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, August, 1956.

Clark, John E., Rear Admiral, USN. "Before the Symington Subcommittee, United States Senate," May, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, August, 1956.

Craig, Kenneth, Rear Admiral, USN. "History's Part in Internal Education and Morale," April, 1957.

Dennison, Robert L., Vice Admiral, USN. "The Navy Today," September, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

Radford, Arthur, Admiral, USN. "Guidelines for Readiness," graduation address at the U. S. Naval Academy, June, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, August, 1956.

_____. "Our Great Task," address before the Southern Governors Conference, September, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "Mutual Defense, A Two-Way Street," September, 1956. Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

Statements by Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff Before Congressional Committees, 1955. A report by the Department of Defense. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955.

Thomas, Charles S., Secretary of the Navy. "Before the Symington Subcommittee, United States Senate," June, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, August, 1956.

_____. "Atomic Power in Today and Tomorrow's Navy," October, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "The Fleet of the Future," November, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives," January, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

Wright, Jerauld, Admiral, USN. "NATO Presentation Before the Overseas Press Club of America," March, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

[illegible]

[illegible] "Patrons [illegible]
[illegible] Navy Public [illegible] 1956.

[illegible] "Navy [illegible] External [illegible] Relations [illegible] April, 1957.

[illegible] "The Navy Today," September, 1956, Navy Public Information. Washington: Department of the Navy, [illegible] 1956.

[illegible] "Recreations for Readiness," reprinted [illegible] Naval Academy, June, 1956, Navy Public Information. Washington: Department of the Navy, [illegible] 1956.

_____. "Our Naval Task," address before the Southern Governors Conference, November, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "Naval Forces, a Monday Street," September, 1956. Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

Statements by Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff before Congressional Committees, 1956. Report of the Department of Defense. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

Thomas, Charles S., "Security of the Navy," before the Washington Publication, Naval Forces, [illegible] 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, August, 1956.

_____. "Road to Tomorrow for Today and Yesterday's Navy," October, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, [illegible] 1956.

_____. "The Years of the Future," November, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, December, 1956.

_____. "Where the Executive on Naval Services, Issue of Open Publication," January, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

Wright, Jerauld, Admiral, USN. "NATO Presentation before the Overseas Press Club of America," March, 1956, Navy Public Statements. Washington: Department of the Navy, May, 1956.

BOOKS

Officer Fact Book--Navy Facts for Officer Counseling. A report prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956 (pretest edition).

MISCELLANEOUS

Army-Navy-Air Force Register, June 8, 1957, on construction of atomic powered aircraft carriers and display of missile submarine at International Naval Review.

Associated Press dispatch, Boston Daily Globe, June 7, 1957, on first ocean-to-ocean flight of carrier-based planes.

"Incorporation of Sea Power Aspects into Training Program," a directive by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Notice #1500, September, 1956.

Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics, NAVPERS 15658, February 28, 1957. Washington: Department of the Navy (Bureau of Naval Personnel), 1957.

"Sea Power, U. S. Navy Credo, and Leadership," a letter from the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel (Education and Training) to the Chief of Naval Personnel, September 7, 1956.

United Press dispatch, Navy Times (Washington, D. C.), April 20, 1957, on submarines authorized, under construction or completed.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS*

Air Defense. All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of the attack of hostile aircraft or guided missiles after they are air-borne.

Air Superiority. That degree of capability (preponderance in morale and material) of one air force over another which permits the conduct of air operations by the former at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing air force.

Air Supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Amphibious Operation. An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. An amphibious operation includes final preparation of the objective area for the landing and operations of naval, air, and ground elements in over-water movements, assault, and mutual support. An amphibious operation may precede a large-scale land operation, in which case it becomes the amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation. After the troops are landed and firmly established ashore the operation becomes a land operation.

Antisubmarine Operations. Operations contributing to the conduct of antisubmarine warfare.

Antisubmarine Warfare. Operations conducted against submarines, their supporting forces, and operating bases.

Base. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. May be preceded by a descriptive word such as "air" or "submarine," which indicates primary purpose.

Close Air Support. The attack by aircraft of hostile ground or naval targets which are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Functions. Responsibilities, missions, and tasks.

In coordination with. In consultation with. This expression means that

---

* From "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Section VII, October, 1953, a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense and quoted in an instruction (OPNAVINST 5410.1A) issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, April 21, 1954.

[illegible]

[illegible] to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's [illegible] aircraft or guided missiles after they are air-borne.

Air superiority. [illegible] of capability (preponderance in morale and material) of one air force over another which permits the conduct of air operations by the former at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing air force.

Air supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Amphibious operation. An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. An amphibious operation includes final preparation of the objective area for the landing and operations of naval, air, and ground elements in over-water movements, assault, and mutual support. An amphibious operation may precede a large-scale land operation, in which case it becomes the amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation. After the troops are landed and firmly established ashore the operation becomes a land operation.

Antisubmarine operations. Operations contributing to the conduct of antisubmarine warfare.

Antisubmarine warfare. Operations conducted against submarines, their supporting forces, and operating bases.

Base. A location from which operations are projected or supported. May be preceded by a descriptive word such as "air" or "seaplane," which indicates primary purpose.

Close air support. The attack by aircraft of hostile ground or naval targets which are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Functions. Responsibilities, missions, and tasks.

In coordination with. In consultation with. This expression means that

---

from "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Staff," section "F", October, 1953, a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense, and from an instruction (JCS 1478/2 Ship,JA) issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, April 21, 1958.

agencies "coordinated with" shall participate actively; that their concurrence shall be sought; and that if concurrence is not obtained, the disputed matter shall be referred to the next higher authority in which all participants have a voice.

Joint. As used in this (function) paper, and generally among the Armed Forces, connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc. in which elements of more than one service of the Department of Defense participate.

Military. A term used in its broadest sense meaning of or pertaining to war or the affairs of war, whether Army, Navy, or Air Force.

Naval Campaign. An operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface, subsurface, air, amphibious, and Marines, for the purpose of gaining, extending, or maintaining control of the sea.

Operation. A military action, or the carrying out of a military mission, strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative; the process of carrying on combat on land, on sea, or in the air, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

Strategic Air Operations. Air operations contributing to the conduct of strategic air warfare.

Strategic Air Warfare. Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stock piles, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Military. A term used in the research [illegible] of or pertaining to war or the military or war, whether army, navy, or air force.

Naval Operation. An operation of a combined series of operations conducted officially by naval forces including all services, sciences, air, medicine, and marines, for the purpose of gaining, exercising, or maintaining control of the sea.

Operation. A military action, or the carrying out of a military mission, strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative; the process of carrying on combat on land, on sea, or in the air, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

Strategic Air Operations. Air operations contributing to the conduct of strategic air warfare.

Strategic Air Warfare. Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include aircraft industry, systems, sources of raw material, critical material, oil, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, concentration of manufacturing plants or of army armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF NAVAL COMMANDS FROM WHICH OFFICER SAMPLE WAS DRAWN

Shore Commands:

Boston Naval Shipyard, Charlestown, Mass.
Commander, Boston Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, South Boston Annex, Boston Naval Shipyard, Boston, Mass.
Commander, U. S. Naval Base, Newport, R. I.
Harbor Defense Unit, Naval Base, Portsmouth, N. H.
Headquarters, First Naval District, Boston, Mass.
U. S. Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, R. I.
U. S. Naval Hospital, Newport, R. I.
U. S. Naval Reserve Training Center, Manchester, N. H.
" " " " " , New Bedford, Mass.
" " " " " , Providence, R. I.
" " " " " , South Portland, Me.
" " " " " , Springfield, Mass.
U. S. Naval Station, Newport, R. I.
U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

Ship Commands:

USS ALBANY (CA-123)--heavy cruiser
USS CAPERTON (DD-650)--destroyer
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FOURTEEN--staff, division of aircraft carriers
USS MACON (CA-132)--heavy cruiser
USS SMALLEY (DD-565)--destroyer
USS WASP (CVS-18)--aircraft carrier

APPENDIX C

COPY OF QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR SURVEY OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN

I. MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING QUESTIONNAIRES TO OFFICERS

8 June 1957

MEMORANDUM

The enclosed questionnaire has been prepared as part of a research project in the graduate division of Boston University's School of Public Relations and Communications.

The study is being conducted as part of a thesis suggested by Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor, USN, Chief of Information, Navy Department, and has been approved by the Commandant, FIRST Naval District.

The thesis is being prepared by the undersigned who is one of the Navy-sponsored students in the graduate division this year.

It would be appreciated if you would complete the questionnaire at your earliest convenience. Deadline for receipt is 20 June. It is requested that you write the answers based upon your present knowledge of the topics covered. Reference to books, publications or other people in answering these questions would defeat the purpose of the study.

A self-addressed envelope is provided for returning the questionnaire.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

K. W. MOORHEAD
Lieutenant, USN

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

I. [illegible] ADDRESSING OFFICIALS [illegible] PRIORS

6 June 1957

MEMORANDUM

The enclosed questionnaire has been prepared as part of a research project in the graduate division of Boston University's School of Public Relations and Communications.

The study is being conducted as part of a thesis suggested by Rear Admiral [illegible] S. Taylor, USN, Chief of Information, Navy Department, and has been approved by the Department, [illegible] Naval District.

The thesis is being prepared by a midshipman who is one of the Navy-sponsored students in the graduate division this year.

It would be appreciated if you would complete the questionnaire at your earliest convenience. Deadline for receipt is 20 June. It is requested that you write the answers based upon your present knowledge of the topics covered. Reference to books, publications or other people in answering these questions would defeat the purpose of the study.

A self-addressed envelope is provided for returning the questionnaire.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

R. W. MORSHEAD
Lieutenant, USN

II. QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire on the Mission and Capabilities

of the U. S. Navy

Date_____

This questionnaire is part of a study to determine the understanding personnel have of the Navy's mission and its capabilities as an instrument of national defense. It is a group study so your answers will be combined immediately with those of the other 200 people being asked the same questions. Your understanding of the Navy's mission and capabilities and your opinions about the need for more information are desired.

The completed questionnaire will be forwarded directly to Boston University's School of Public Relations and Communications, Division of Research, where the study is being conducted.

Your name is not needed, but it is extremely important that you give your true feelings and honest opinions in answers to these questions in order that the survey will be of value to the research project. The final report of the group study will be made available to the Navy Department.

- - -

In order to tabulate the results of the study the following information is needed:

What is your rate or rank?_____Age?_____
If an officer, what is your designator?_____
How many years have you served on active duty in the Navy?_____
Do you plan to make the Navy a career?_____
Are you in the reserves or the regular Navy?_____
Were you based ashore or aboard ship at your
last permanent duty station?_____
Have you served overseas since World War II?_____
What command are you attached to now?_____
What was the last school grade (or year) you completed?_____
If you went to college, what was your major?_____
What is your marital status?
Single_____Married_____Divorced_____Widower_____
Do you have dependent children?_____
In which state or foreign country did you live the longest as a child?

_____

What kind of work does (or did) your father do?_____
When do you expect to be out of the Navy?_____
Do you have a civilian skill or occupational specialty?_____
If so, what is it?_____

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

This questionnaire [illegible] survey to determine the [illegible] personnel have of the Navy's mission and its capabilities as an instrument of national defense. [illegible] prompt study on your answers will be [illegible] immediately with those of the other 300 people being asked the same questions. Your understanding of the Navy's mission and capabilities and your opinions about the need for more information are desired.

The completed questionnaire will be forwarded directly to Princeton University's School of Public Relations and Communications, Division of Research, where the study is being conducted.

Your name is not needed, but it is extremely important that you give your true feelings and honest opinions in answers to these questions in order that the survey will be of value to the research project. The final report of the group study will be made available to the Navy [illegible].

- - -

In order to calculate the results of the study the following information is needed:

What is your rank or rate? _____ Age? _____

If an officer, what is your designator? _____

How many years have you served on active duty in the Navy? _____

Do you plan to make the Navy a career? _____

Are you in the reserves or the regular Navy? _____

Were you based ashore or aboard ship at your last permanent duty station? _____

Have you served overseas since World War II? _____

What command are you attached to now? _____

What was the last school grade (or year) you completed? _____

If you went to college, what was your major? _____

What is your marital status?

Single _____ Married _____ Divorced _____ Widower _____

Do you have dependent children? _____

In which state or foreign country did you live the longest as a child? _____

What kind of work does (or did) your father do? _____

What do you expect to do out of the Navy? _____

Do you have a civilian skill or occupational specialty? _____

If so, what is it? _____

The questionnaire is divided into three parts: Mission, capabilities, and sources of information. There are no right or wrong answers in the usual sense. The purpose of the study is to find out what you can tell us about these subjects. There is no time limit in answering the questions.

Mission

1. As far as you know, did the Navy take any action in the Israeli-Egyptian crisis?_____. If so, what did it do?_____

_____

_____

2. Do you feel that the Navy is receiving sufficient public recognition for the job it is doing in the Mediterranean?

Yes_____ No_____ Undecided_____

3. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the mission of the three military services?

Have very little understanding_____ Have some understanding_____ Have a very good understanding_____

4. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy's mission or not?

Yes_____ No_____ Undecided_____

5. Would you like to know more about the Navy's mission or not?

Yes_____ No_____ Undecided_____

6. Newspapers frequently mention the following organizations. What do the letters stand for?

NATO_____

SEATO_____

7. The Sixth Fleet has been kept in the Mediterranean for a number of years. What do you think is the purpose of keeping it there?

8. Which of the following had the most influence on your first enlistment in the Navy?

To avoid being drafted _____

Because of career opportunities in the Navy _____

Because of travel opportunities the Navy offers _____

Because the Navy is the most important branch of the service _____

Relatives wanted me to join the Navy _____

I like ships and the sea _____

Other (specify)_____

[illegible]

1. [illegible] opinion course? _____. If so, what did it do? _____

_____

_____

2. Do you feel that the Navy is receiving sufficient public recognition for its [illegible] in the Mediterranean?

Yes _____ No _____ Undecided _____

3. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the mission of the shore military services?

Have very little understanding _____ Have some understanding _____ Have a very good understanding _____

4. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy's mission or not?

Yes _____ No _____ Undecided _____

5. Would you like to know more about the Navy's mission or not?

Yes _____ No _____ Undecided _____

6. Newspapers frequently mention the following organizations. What do the Letters stand for?

ATC _____

SATC _____

7. The Sixth Fleet has been kept in the Mediterranean for a number of years. What do you think is the purpose of keeping it there?

8. Which of the following had the most influence on your first enlistment in the Navy?

To avoid being drafted _____

Because of career opportunities in the Navy _____

Because of travel opportunities the Navy offers _____

Because the Navy is the most important branch of the service _____

[illegible] _____

[illegible] _____

[illegible] _____

[illegible] _____

9. The Seventh Fleet has been kept in the Formosa area for a number of years. Which of the following do you think has been its most important job?

To halt a communist attack on Formosa _____
To slow down the spread of communism in southeast Asia _____
To prevent the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa from attacking the mainland _____
Because the Seventh Fleet has to be kept somewhere and this is as good a place as any _____

10. What changes, if any, have the nation's leaders shown recently in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy in a future conflict?

Decreased very much	Decreased some	No change	Increased some	Increased very much
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

11. Think of the part the Navy played in the country's defense in World War II. How about today? How do you think the part it now plays compares with that of World War II?

Greater importance now	About the same importance	Less important today than in World War II
_____	_____	_____

12. What do you think the Navy's job is in the air defense of the United States?

13. In your opinion, what is the Navy's mission? (Discuss in detail as to roles, functions, responsibilities, jobs, etc. Please do not say just "control of the seas.")

[illegible]

[illegible]

_____

_____

_____

10. What changes, if any, have the nation's leaders shown recently in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy in a future conflict?

Greatly increased	Somewhat increased	No change	Decreased somewhat	Decreased very much
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

11. Think of the part the Navy played in the country's defense in World War II. How about today? How do you think the part it now plays compares with that of World War II?

Greater importance now	About the same importance	Less important today than in World War II
_____	_____	_____

12. What do you think the Navy's job is in the air defense of the United States?

13. In your opinion, what is the Navy's mission? (Answer in terms of its roles, functions, responsibilities, jobs, etc. I ask you to not say just "control of the seas.")

Capabilities

1. Since World War II a number of scientific developments have increased the Navy's power to wage war. What are some of these?

2. In what country were the last amphibious landings made by the Navy under actual combat conditions?

3. Do you happen to know whether or not the Navy can launch guided missiles from submarines?

Can be launched_____ Can NOT be launched_____ Don't know_____

4. Two of the Navy's experimental jet seaplanes crashed recently. Do you know if the Navy is continuing to develop this plane or not?

Continuing to develop_____ Decided to drop_____ Don't know_____

5. Do you happen to know how many nuclear powered submarines the Navy has in service and under construction altogether? (Include those Congress has appropriated funds for.)

3____ 9____ 15____ 21____
6____ 12____ 18____ 24____

6. How many submarines do you think Russia has?

7. Does Russia have any nuclear powered submarines? Yes____ No____

8. How well do you feel that you are kept informed about the capabilities of the Navy resulting from new weapons?

Little informed_____ Medium well informed_____ Well informed_____

9. Do you know what a hunter-killer group is? Yes____ No____

10. What do you think is the primary job of a hunter-killer group?

11. What is the longest distance the Navy's newest carrier-based planes can fly? (Total of the mileage out and back.)

12. What percentage of the world's land area would you guess can now be reached by carrier-based planes?

Up to 25%____ 25 to 50%____ 50 to 75%____ 75 to 100%____

13. Each new weapon is designed to fit into the over-all capability of the Navy. Do you feel fairly certain that you know how each would be used in battle?

Don't know_____ Not sure_____ Fairly sure_____ Very sure_____

14. The Navy's new atomic weapons have caused some change in its capabilities since World War II. How much change do you think has taken place?

Little change_____ Moderate change_____ Great change_____ Very great change_____

15. Do you think that the aircraft carrier is becoming more important in the event of a future war or less important?

More_____ Less_____ Same_____ Don't know_____

16. Which weapon of <u>any</u> of the three military services do you think would be the <u>most</u> important single weapon in a future war?

17. List as many things you think the Navy could do to stop the enemy and bring victory. Include as many major warfare activities or jobs as possible.

[illegible]

[illegible] _____ [illegible] _____ [illegible] _____ [illegible] _____

[illegible] possibilities since [illegible] 1. [illegible] such change do you think [illegible] under [illegible]

_____ [illegible] _____ [illegible] _____ [illegible] _____
change _____ [illegible] _____ [illegible] _____ change _____

15. Do you think this [illegible] weapon is becoming more important in the event of a future war or less important?

one _____ [illegible] _____ [illegible] _____ don't know _____

16. Which weapon of any of the three military services do you think would be the most important atomic weapon in a future war?

17. What is Army [illegible] the Army could do to stop the enemy and bring victory. [illegible] any major warfare activities or jobs as possible.

Sources of Information

1. Where do you get most of your information about the Navy (List names of newspapers, magazines, people, etc.)

2. Do you think that ship and station newspapers are effective or ineffective in keeping personnel informed about the Navy?

Effective_____ Ineffective_____ Undecided_____

3. Do you send your ship's newspaper home to your family or friends?

Never_____ Sometimes_____ Often_____

4. How often do you read articles on the following topics? (Check the column that best indicates how often you read such articles.)

	Never	Sometimes	Often
Navy's role in peacetime?	____	_____	____
Navy's role in wartime?	____	_____	____
Sea Power?	____	_____	____
New weapons?	____	_____	____
National strategy of U.S.?	____	_____	____
Articles on NATO, SEATO, and similar military pacts?	____	_____	____

5. Where do you think that most of the instruction on the Navy's mission and capabilities should be given?

In schools____ On-the-job____ Both____ Don't know____

6. Some service personnel feel that there is a great amount of information available from official Navy publications. Do you agree with this?

Yes_____ No_____

7. Are official Navy publications available to you when you want to read them?

Yes_____ No_____

8. In your opinion, how do you think wives of naval personnel feel about the amount of information they are getting about the Navy?

Believe they would like more____ Believe they have enough____ They get too much information now____

9. If married, do you think it would help you in your work if your wife knew more about the Navy?

Yes____ No____ Some____ Much____ Don't know____ Not married____

10. The television programs called "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log" have been produced from Navy background material. Have you seen either of these programs?

Have seen one_____ Have seen both_____ Have NOT seen either_____

11. How effective do you think these programs are in telling the public about the Navy?

Not effective_____ Fairly effective_____ Very effective_____

12. Special lectures on the increasing importance of the Navy are being given at many naval commands. The lecture is illustrated with a series of color slides showing the new developments and capabilities of the Navy. Have you seen this presentation?

Yes_____ No_____

13. Do you feel that the Navy is telling you enough about its mission?

Yes_____ No_____

14. How do you feel about the amount of information the Navy gives you about what's going on within the service?

We receive too MUCH information _____
We don't receive ENOUGH information _____
We receive just about the right amount of information _____

15. In your opinion, is the Navy giving its people enough training on the mission and capabilities?

Yes_____ No_____ Undecided_____

16. What are your suggestions on new ways of keeping naval personnel informed about the mission and capabilities of the Navy?

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] about the Navy?

[illegible] effective _____ Very effective _____ Very ineffective _____

12. Special lectures on the increasing importance of the Navy are being given at Navy Naval commands. The lecture is illustrated with a series of color slides showing the new developments and capabilities of the Navy. Have you seen this presentation?

Yes _____ No _____

13. Do you feel that the Navy is telling you enough about its mission?

Yes _____ No _____

14. How do you feel about the amount of information the Navy gives you about what's going on within the service

We receive too much information _____
We don't receive ENOUGH information _____
We receive just about the right amount of information _____

15. In your opinion, is the Navy telling its people enough training on the mission and capabilities?

Yes _____ No _____ Undecided _____

16. What are your suggestions on ways of keeping naval personnel informed about the mission and capabilities of the Navy?

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION ANNEX TO OPERATIONAL PLANS

(Portion pertaining to Recommendation No. 3)

Public Information Annex

(For a Force Commander)

Security classification. All information relative to this training exercise will remain unclassified.

Informing personnel. Commanding officers of individual ships and attached units are authorized and encouraged to advise their personnel of dates and places involved herein immediately upon receipt of this plan. Enough additional information should be provided personnel so that they can make personal plans accordingly.

Date of release to press. The first news release will be made by the Force Commander approximately three weeks in advance of departure date of ships from the Continental United States.

Responsibility for scheduling. It shall be the responsibility of the Force Plans Officer to advise the Force Public Information Officer of all plans as soon as they are approved. The Force Public Information Officer will prepare and release the original over-all announcement of this exercise. The Force Plans Officer will advise the Force Public Information Officer of all important changes to the original plan and keep him informed of current progress in execution of this exercise.

(Other instructions in this annex would include policy matters in regard to news releases by subordinate commands, coordination between information officers, transportation of news media representatives embarked in ships, etc.*)

*Note: The above is recommended as an addition to Chapter 11, "Exercises and Operations," in the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual.